Battle for Article 371F: Struggle And Triumph

The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment: Supreme Court of India, 1993.

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   “These are the times that try men’s souls. The summer solidiers and the sunshine patriots will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict the more glorious the triumph.”

-Thomas Paine

   “…for without victory, there is no survival.”

-          Wintson Churchill

   “And I know that if you carry these words through to the end, it will be a victory…not just for you, but for something that should win, that moves the world…and never wins acknowledgment.”

-          Aryan Rand, Atlas Shrugged

 

     I began the new year on a positive note. I was convinced that 1993 would bring significant changes in my life. I have always been acutely aware of the fact that on completion of every ten years, new avenues and new opportunities seem to gradually unfold. And as I lay on my bed on the first day of January 1993, I was deeply conscious of the fact that the new year would bring something different in my personal and professional life.

   One of the most exciting and meaningful news for me in recent times came on February 10. We had won in the Assembly seat reservation case in the Supreme Court, which was kept pending for 14 years. The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgement on February 10, upheld reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas (BLs) and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly. The judgement also upheld the validity of the 36^th Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, which provided special status to ethnic and religious groups in Sikkim.  This historic judgement, delivered by a five-judge constitution bench on February 10, came as a great surprise to most people although some of us were expecting a verdict on the seat issue any time during that period.

   For me, the Supreme Court verdict was a personal victory. It was my first New Year gift! I felt a deep sense of satisfaction and security and was happy that our efforts to preserve our identity and retain our political rights had not gone waste. After nearly one and half decades of legal wrangle, we had finally triumphed. This was a significant achievement of historical significance.

   A five-judge constitution bench by 3:2 majority judgement upheld the validity of the 36^th Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, which provided special provisions in Article 371F of the Constitution to accommodate certain incidents of the evolution of the political institutions of Sikkim. The verdict also upheld the validity of an amendment to the Representation of People Act, 1950/51, reserving 12 seats for the minority ethnic Bhutia-Lepchas and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly.  The majority judgement delivered by the Chief Justice designate, Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, on behalf of Justice J.S. Verma and Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy and himself, upheld reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly.

   Justice S.C. Agarwal, in a separate judgement, agreed with the judgement on the issue of reservation of 12 seats for the BLs, but differed on the issue of one seat for the Sangha. Chief Justice L.M. Sharma delivered a dissenting judgement and observed that reservation of as many as 12 seats for the BLs was disproportionate to the ratio of population of the BLs to the total population of Sikkim. Justice Sharma, who was to retire as Chief Justice the very next day (Feb 11), while striking down the seat reserved for the Sangha as unconstitutional, directed dissolution of the Assembly and called for fresh elections.

   The judgement delivered by Justice Venkatachaliah on petitions filed by Ram Chandra Poudyal and his brother Somnath Poudyal (now in the ruling SSP), while upholding the validity of Article 371F of the Constitution, observed: “The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment.”

    The apex court’s views, as reflected in the historic judgement, regarding Article 371F of the Constitution relating to Sikkim, noted: “Article 371F(f) cannot be said to violate any basic feature of the Constitution such as the democratic principle. From 1975 and onwards, Sikkim has been emerging from a political society and monarchical system into the mainstream of a democratic way of life and an industrial civilisation. The process and pace of this political transformation is necessarily reliant on its institutions of the past. Mere existence of a Constitution, by itself, does not ensure constitutionalism or a constitutional culture. It is the political maturity and traditions of a people that import meaning to a Constitution which otherwise merely embodies political hopes and ideals. The provisions of clause (f) of Article 371F and the consequent changes in the electoral laws were intended to recognize and accommodate the pace of the growth of the political institutions of Sikkim and to make the transition gradual and peaceful and to prevent dominance of one section of the population over another on the basis of ethnic loyalties and identities. These adjustments reflect a political expediencies for the maintenance of social equilibrium. The political and social maturity and of economic development might in course of time enable the people of Sikkim to transcend and submerge these ethnic apprehensions and imbalances and might in future – one hopes sooner – usher in a more egalitarian dispensation. Indeed, the impugned provisions, in their very nature, contemplate and provide for a transitional phase in the political evolution of Sikkim and are hereby essentially transitional in character.”

   The judgement added: “It is true that the reservation of seats of the kind and the extent brought about by the impugned provisions may not, if applied to the existing States of the Union, pass Constitutional muster. We are of the view that the impugned provisions have been found in the wisdom of Parliament necessary in the admission of strategic border State into the Union. The departures are not such as to negate fundamental principles of democracy.”

   Referring to the reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas, the judgement said: “The degree of proportionality of reservation has to be viewed in the historical development and the rules of apportionment of political power that obtained between the different groups prior to the merger of the territory in India. A parity had been maintained all through. The provisions in the particular situation and the permissible latitudes, cannot be said to be unconstitutional.”

  The judgement further observed: “The provision in the Constitution indicating proportionality of representation is necessarily a broad, general and logical principle but not intended to be express with arithmetical precision. Article 332(3A) and 333 are illustrative instances. The principle of mathematical proportionality of representation is not declared basic requirement in each and every part of the territory of India. Accommodations and adjustments, having regard to the political maturity, awareness and degree of political development in different parts of India, might supply justification for even non-elected Assemblies wholly or in part, in certain parts of the country. The differing degrees of political development and maturity of various parts of the country, may not justify standards based on mathematical accuracy.

   Articles 371A, a special provision in respect of State of Nagaland, 239A and 240 illustrate the permissible areas and degrees of departure. The systematic deficiencies in the plenitude of the doctrine of full and effective representation has not been understood in the constitutional philosophy as derogating from the democratic principle. Indeed, the argument in the case, in the perspective, is really one of violation of the equality principle rather than of the democratic principle. The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment.”

   Regarding reservation of seats for the minority Bhutia-Lepchas in the Assembly, Justice Agarwal in his judgement noted: “The reservation of seats of Bhutias and Lepchas is necessary because they constitute a minority and in the absence of reservation they may not have any representation in the Legislative Assembly. Sikkimese of Nepali origin constitute the majority in Sikkim and on their own electoral strength they can secure representation in the Legislative Assembly against the unreserved seats. Moreover, Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin have a distinct culture and tradition which is different from that of Sikkimese of Nepali origin. Keeping this distinction in mind Bhutias and Lepchas have been declared Scheduled Tribes under Article 342 of the Constitution.”

   Justice Agarwal added: “The said declaration has not been questioned before us. The Constitution in Article 342 makes express provision for reservation of seats in the Legislative Assembly of a State for Scheduled Tribes. Such a reservation which is expressly permitted by the Constitution cannot be challenged on the ground of denial of right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.”

   The Court also upheld the reservation of one seat for the Sangha in the Assembly on similar ground: “The Sangha, the Buddha and the Dharma are the three fundamental postulates and symbols of Buddhism. In that sense they are religious institutions. However, the literature on the history of development of the political institutions of Sikkim adverted to earlier tend to show that the Sangha had played an important role in the political and social life of the Sikkimese people. It had made its own contribution to the Sikkimese culture and political development. There is material to sustain the conclusion that the ‘Sangha’ had long been associated itself closely with the political developments of Sikkim and was inter-woven with the social and political life of its people. In view of this historical association, the provisions in the matter of reservation of a seat for the Sangha recognizes the social and political role of the institution more than its purely religious identity.”

   The judgement further observed: “In the historical setting of Sikkim and its social and political evolution the provision has to be construed really as not invoking the impermissible idea of a separate electorate either. Indeed, the provision bears comparison to Article 333 providing reservation for the Anglo-Indian community. So far as the provision for the Sangha is concerned, it is to be looked at as enabling a nomination but the choice of the nomination being left to the ‘Sangha’ itself. We are conscious that a separate electorate for a religious denomination would be obnoxious to the fundamental principles of our secular Constitution. If a provision is made purely on the basis of religious consideration for election of a member of that religious group on the basis of a separate electorate, that would, indeed, be wholly unconstitutional. But in the case of the Sangha, it is not merely a religious institution. It has been historically a political and social institution in Sikkim and the provisions in regard to the seat reserved admit of being construed as nomination and the Sangha itself being assigned the task of and enabled to indicate the choice of its nominee. The provision can be sustained on this construction.”

Thanking former Chief Justice of India, Justice MN Venkatachaliah , for the Sikkim verdict. 

   My report on the Supreme Court verdict carried in the February 14, 1993, issue of the Statesman, stated: “The verdict was widely welcomed by the people, particularly the tribals, who claimed that even after 13 years of legal and political onslaught against the community, the effort to abolish their reserved seats and take away their political rights had failed.” The feeling that we had at long last successfully defended our rights in the highest court of the land was shared by many people who celebrated the victory in their own quiet way as is customary among the Sikkimese   In invited Anup Deb, Chewang Tobgay and Sonam P. Wangdi, a Sikkimese lawyer who had contributed his share on the seat reservation case, for lunch at home soon after the news of the Supreme Court decision reached Gangtok. It was a quiet affair and all of us were genuinely happy over the outcome of the case. Members of our 1983-84 team, which fought the seat case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Sikkim Tribal Welfare Association (STWA), an intervening part in the case, were Deb, Chewang and myself. The only person who was not present at my place was Jigdal T. Densapa, the former Home Secretary, who by then had retired from government service. Though officially representing the State Government – one of the respondents in the case – Densapa was very much part of our team.

   It was truly a well-deserved reward for those who had for a long time worked sincerely and painstakingly for the right cause. We knew that it was a victory not only for the Bhutia-Lepchas and the Sangha but for the entire Sikkimese people, whose rights and interests were protected under Article 371F of the Constitution.

   Those of us who were associated with the case were aware of the fact that Poudyal had really not lost anything in the case as he did not ask for reservation of seats for the Sikkimese Nepalese. Many people in Sikkim were under the impression that Poudyal, in his petition, had demanded restoration of Assembly seats reserved for the Sikkimese Nepalese. We had only ably defended ourselves against those who were determined to erase us from the face of the earth. I was convinced through this experience that no matter how long it may take, sincere effort and hard work for a good cause pays in the long run. I was also fully convinced that no power on earth can crush anyone if the people themselves fight and resist all forms of domination and exploitation with all the might at their disposal.

 

(Ref: Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 1993)

 

 

PANG LHABSOL

SOME THOUGHTS ON ‘PANG LHABSOL’

Worship of Khangchendzonga and celebration of Sikkimese unity must not be clubbed together.

By Jamyang Dorjee Chakrishar, Tibetan calligrapher and former civil servant

   We have seen that there are divergent views and explanation of the word "Pangtoe". Two main views; the first views believes that the word 'Pang' means 'witness' and that the Pangtoe Chham actually started as a celebration of the swearing-in of the great blood brotherhood of Bhutias and Lepchas at Kabi Lungtsok, North Sikkim, in the 13^th century, where Lord Gangs chen mzod lgna (Khangchendzonga) was a witness.

   The second view is that 'Pang toe' has nothing to do with the celebration of blood brotherhood at Kabi Lungtsok. It is a warrior dance performed by Pemayangtse Monastery, West Sikkim, and later at Tsuklakhang Monastery, Gangtok, in praise of Lord Gangs chen mzod lgna.

   Prior to the coronation of the first Chogyal Phuntsok Namgyal in 1642, Lhatsun Chenpo, the great Dzogchen master of Vajrayana Buddhism, who opened the ‘hidden land’ of Beyul Demajong (Sikkim) in the 17^th century, composed Dralha dpangs ༼དཔངས་བསྟོད༽ stoe or prayers for Gangs Chen mzod lgna and other deities of Sikkim and during the reign of Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal dpangs toe Chham was composed and performed. 

   Let us look at the spellings of the word in question. There are three spellings of the same pronounced in Tibetan. 1. spang སྤང་༼རྩྭ་སྔོན་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཐང་སྟེང་༽ Spang means land covered with green pastures, or reference as Pangri, Pang-shong 2. Dpangs. དཔངས་བསྟོད་༼མཐོ་བར་བསྟོད་པ། ༽ dpangs-stoe means great felicitation or prayer. 3. dpang དཔང་means witness

   Dra-lha spsngs-stoe དཔངས་བསྟོད་ is a regular prayer performed by the lamas of Sikkim. They based their prayer on sbrs-sjong-gney-gsol (prayer for sacred places of Sikkim) compiled by Taklung Gasi Rinpoche in consultation with Dilgo Khentse Rinpoche, Ja-drel Sangye Dorjee and which is published by the Palace in 1988. Jang-gter dra-lha dpangs-stoe 'gshen-phen-rol-pa' has the actual word spoken by Guru Padma Sambhava as revealed by Terton Rigzen rgoe-dhem and also words written by Lhatsun Namkha Jigme himself. Both these prayers mentioned Dra-Lha dpangs-stoe and clearly spelt out as 'dpangs-stoe', དཔངས་བསྟོད་ , meaning great felicitation or prayer.

   According to notes made by the Burmiak Kazi bKra shis dgra 'dul gdan sa-pa from the original manuscript preserved at Talung and appeared in 'Waddell, Buddhism,p.49' and also appeared in 'Oracles and Demons of Tibet' by Rene De Nebesky-Wojkowitz, p217 : When Lha-tsun-chenpo finally reached his destination (Dra-lha-gang at Dzongri), he performed a thanksgiving ceremony to all the deities of the country for his safe journey across the Himalaya; this tradition was annually repeated by Sangchen Pemayangtse Monastery and became more elaborate in the course of time. Further, this ceremony became more elaborate, until its present form, including the performance of the mask dance, was established by Phyagrdor rnam rgyal, the third ruler of Sikkim (1686-1717) in cooperation with the sprul sku Jigs med dpa bo, the third re-birth of Lha-Tsun-Chenpo.

 

To conclude:

   If we conclude sbrs-sjong-gney-gsol, the writings of Lhatsun Chenpo himself duly compiled and edited by by Taklung Gasi Rinpoche in consultation with Dilgo Khentse Rinpoche, Ja-drel Sangye Dorjee as authentic then the spelling of the word is དཔངས་བསྟོད་dpangs stoe (great prayer) and not དཔང་བསྟོད་dpang toe (witness prayer)

   I have not seen any reference where Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal decided to perform Pang Lhabsol celebrating the blood brotherhood pact at Kabi, an event that happened six generations ago. I am not ruling out completely the non-existence of such source. If Pang Lhabsol was meant to celebrate the great historical brotherhood pact then some references must be mentioned in the dpangs stoe cham yik or the text of the chhams (dance), which I learnt does not exist.

    Another interesting tradition is the arrival of a Mun or Bong-thing, a day preceding the Pang Lhabsol dance to the Palace. The Bong-thing goes into trance and possessed by the spirit of Thekong Thek, reminds the Chogyal of the great blood brotherhood pact and approaches the Chogyal for the fault his ancestors had committed as alleged by the Lepchas. The Chogyal has to assure the welfare of the Lepchas and request the spirit for the success of the forthcoming dance.

    Research needs to be done on whether the appearance of the Bong-thing preceding Pang Lhabsol started during the time of Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal and on whether the Bong-thing commanded the Chogyal to perform Pang Lhabsol to celebrate the brotherhood pact.

   My opinion: All said and done, if the composer of dPangs sToe or Pang Lhabsol Chham was to celebrate the unity of the Bhutia and Lepcha or appeasing the protecting deities for prosperity and unity of the people, the intellectuals of the present generation must collectively work to establish the fact to achieve the best purpose for which Pang Lhabsol was aimed and not pass on the confusion to the next generation.

   The division of opinion will further weaken the communities which are already in minority. The swearing-in of blood brotherhood of Bhutias and Lepchas at Kabi Lungtsok between Thekong Thek, the Lepcha chief, and Gya Bum sa, the Bhutia leader, was a historic event. Naturally, as a tribal tradition, such a big event must have happened by swearing-in or putting as a witness to the highest revered object of the country, which is Lord Gangs-chen-mzod-lnga. Therefore, there is, I think no dispute in this theory. The dispute is when we try to link this great historical event to the dpangs- stoe Chham during spangs Lha- sol.

   Kabi Lungtsok event plays a vital role in the restoration of pride and unity of the Bhutias and Lepchas. This historical brotherhood pact is of great significance, a binding factor between the two communities and giving a religious colour to it actually lessens its importance. This day deserves a separate national honor, depicting the unbroken lineage of 800 years of peaceful coexistence of Sikkimese people which is unique to Sikkim.

 

 

 

India invoking Buddha to counter China

Why Modi should meet Dalai Lama and get Karmapa back

Since New Delhi cannot militarily reverse the border situation, it is now demonstrating Buddhism as a native religion to India, even though there are more followers in China.

Jyoti Malhotra

26 April, 2023

   At the Global Buddhist Summit in New Delhi last week, the 87-year-old Dalai Lama exhorted his audience of monks from all over the world as well as the lay audience to focus on the heart of Buddha’s teachings “a combination of compassion and wisdom”, and invoked great Indian Buddhist scholars like Chandrakirti, Kamalashila and Shantideva to point to the enormous storehouse of philosophy and logic that still makes Buddhism one of the most attractive religions in the world.

   Only a few noticed that the Buddhist summit was held in the same cruel month of April—with due credit to T S Eliot—which marks the third anniversary of the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. So just as the first Covid wave was taking over the country and Indian doctors were trying to deal with it, Chinese troops were climbing the plateau that ends in the LAC.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama addressing the congregation at the Global Buddhist Summit 2023 at the Ashok Hotel in New Delhi, India on April 21, 2023. Photo by Tenzin Choejor

   We know all this by now. We also know that the Chinese have been building major infrastructure, including a hot-mix plant that mixes up various materials to build roads, including an 11 kilometre-road on the its own side of the Depsang Plains. But it seems the Chinese are now unwilling to make any more concessions, which is why Indian troops can no longer patrol beyond the “bottleneck” in Depsang, which they used to do at least until 2014.

   This is also probably why the 18th India-China corps commander-level talks that took place this Sunday on the Chinese side of the Chushul-Moldo meeting point have yielded no results.

1959 Claim Line

   All eyes are now on the defence minister-level meeting under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on 27 April, where defence minister Rajnath Singh is expected to hold bilateral talks with Chinese defence minister Gen Li Shangfu. Officials say Singh is expected to forcibly raise the issue of the restoration of peace and stability on the Depsang Plains.

   Nothing much is expected to come from that conversation too. According to ThePrint columnist, Gen H S Panag, former army commander of the 14 Corps which is stationed in Ladakh, by disallowing Indian patrols in Depsang and insisting on buffer zones on the Indian side of the LAC, the Chinese have reached the “1959 claim line” that Chinese premier Chou-en Lai had then offered Jawaharlal Nehru as part of the border compromise.

The 16th Karmapa and Dalai Lama

   Nehru’s outright refusal gave way to the 1962 border conflict. Now, 60 years later, the Chinese seem to have achieved their aims on the ground, without bothering too much about the LAC and its various perceptions. Not that they are occupying “Indian territory,” or at least India’s perception of its territory—the Chinese are much too smart to do that. They have established control and they will rest for the time being. The buffer zones that have been established are intended to save face for India. The 1959 Claim Line was always intended to protect Aksai Chin and other areas that the Chinese forcefully took in 1962 and have kept ever since.

   Since it will be difficult for India to militarily reverse this situation, it has now decided to shift course and take a leaf out of Buddha’s teachings and marry them with ‘ahimsa‘ (active non-violence). Some would say that India has no alternative but to do this, which is true. It may not even amount to very much, unless Delhi takes other measures—such as taking the Dalai Lama into confidence and plan a few next moves. So last week’s Summit demonstrated that Buddhism is a native religion to India, even though there are more followers inside China. And as Prime Minister Narendra Modi pointed out during his remarks at the Global Buddhist Summit, the policy of ahimsa is a far better bet than the powerful moves made by the Communist Party of China globally.

   It’s not a bad strategy. Instead of allowing the Chinese to rudely underline its military manoeuvres, including in Ladakh, India is trying to shift global perceptions in favour of its traditional strengths – not just democracy, but also the democracy of religions.

   For two days at the Ashoka hotel last week, the jury was out in favour of the New Delhi-based International Buddhist Confederation. Monks in saffron and maroon and burgundy robes from all over the Buddhist world – from Mongolia to South Korea to Russia (about one million Buddhists are in Buryatia province) to the South-East Asian nations to Mexico, the US, Canada and Elsewhere – nodded and smiled and exchanged compassionate greetings. Only the Chinese, predictably, didn’t show up.

The Dalai Lama and the 17th Karmapa Ogyen Trinlay Dorji

   Over lunch on the second day, where the Dalai Lama sat at the centre of the long table, all the global orders exchanged notes with each other. Clearly, the Dalai Lama is a star—even though he is ageing, everyone wants a piece of him. Perhaps, it’s because he’s the only man the Chinese don’t really know what to make of. They can come right up to their 1959 Claim Line in Depsang and tie up the loose ends of History after nearly 60 years, but they cannot understand why this laughing monk commands so much influence not just inside India, but all over the world.

   Certainly, when the Dalai Lama passes on, the Chinese will produce their own man. That’s what they have done with the Gelugpa order’s second-most important monk, the Panchen Lama – which is a bit odd, considering the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t even acknowledge the idea of religion, let alone its place in the universe.

   PM Modi made sure that he and the Dalai Lama didn’t attend the meeting on the same day, and definitely not at the same time – perhaps Modi didn’t want to poke the Chinese too directly in the eye. The PM and the Dalai Lama have, indeed, met once, in 2015, and by all accounts the meeting didn’t go so well. Eight years later, though, as the third anniversary of the standoff in Ladakh is marked this April, it might not be a bad idea if Modi drops in on this very special Buddhist monk in Dharamsala – and ask him to lead the way towards world peace.

Missing Karma Kagyu link

  There was one big hole at the Buddhist summit last week – the absence of the Karmapa Lama, Ogyen Trinley Dorji, who left India in a huff some years ago and now lives in Germany or the US or both. It is high time that he is persuaded to return, and all the controversies related to him over the last few years should be settled amicably. If India is to become the leading light of Buddhist nations worldwide, the head of the Karma Kagyu sect cannot be missing.

   So, what’s it to be? Om mani padme hum, or Om bhur bhuva swaha – the Buddhist invocation or the Sanskrit one? Modi’s presence at the Buddhist summit demonstrated that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has come to terms with the egalitarian nature of Buddhism. And since “unity in diversity” is India’s motto, both these prayers – and indeed, others – should not just be par for the course, but also on the same menu.

(Jyoti Malhotra is a senior consulting editor at ThePrint. She tweets @jomalhotra. Views are personal.)

 

 

ANALYSIS

China’s Border Talks With Bhutan Are Aimed at India

The disputed Doklam plateau is a pressure point for both regional powers. Beijing is moving in.

By Marcus Andreopoulos, a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation.

JULY 18, 2023

As tensions between China and India have grown in the last few years, the countries wedged between them are becoming more strategically significant. The two competing powers have sought a buffer between them ever since their founding—1949 in the case of the People’s Republic of China, and 1947 for India. Many scholars argue that it is this desire for a safety cushion that led to China’s 1950 invasion of Tibet. Today, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) efforts to manipulate democracy in Nepal have succeeded in shaping a government in Kathmandu that is more receptive to Beijing than to New Delhi. The CCP has also extended its reach to monitor and suppress the Tibetan community there.

   In recent months, China has also turned its attention eastward to its long-standing border dispute with the Kingdom of Bhutan. After years of so-called salami slicing along their shared border, as documented in Foreign Policy, China is attempting to engage in negotiations with Bhutan to formalize its ill-gotten gains—a strategy reminiscent of China’s playbook along its border with India and in the South China Sea. What is different is the strategic importance of Bhutan’s disputed regions to the China-India relationship.

   Chinese control of the disputed Doklam plateau would allow Beijing unhindered mobilization and more access routes in the event of military conflict with New Delhi. As a result, any China-Bhutan talks are not just a bilateral issue, but rather part of a Chinese strategy to gain a crucial advantage over India. A resolution between the CCP and the government of Bhutan would reverberate throughout India, threatening peace in the region and escalating the crisis along the Sino-Indian border. The issue requires close attention from New Delhi as well as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—the Indo-Pacific partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

   Although it has no diplomatic presence in Bhutan, China has gone to great lengths to ensure lines of communication remain open between the two countries. This year, discussions about the border have increased in frequency after a nearly two-year lull, reflecting greater urgency on Beijing’s part. The latest meeting took place in May in Thimphu, Bhutan, just months after Chinese and Bhutanese representatives gathered in Kunming, China. The group agreed to “push forward” a three-step road map signed in October 2021, with the overarching aim of facilitating another round of formal boundary talks, which were postponed following the 2017 standoff between China and India in Doklam and the COVID-19 pandemic.

   That Chinese diplomats have returned to the negotiating table with their Bhutanese counterparts has likely fueled unease in India and among the other Quad countries. After his state visit to Brussels in March, an interview with Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering by the Belgian newspaper La Libre highlighted his country’s readiness to resolve the ongoing issue on its border with China. Unsurprisingly, Chinese state media latched on to the article to put further pressure on India; the Global Times singled out New Delhi as the “main obstacle” standing in the way of settling the dispute.

   However, resolving the issue of China and Bhutan’s border is not a simple task. China now lays claim to locations in three separate geographic locations, including Doklam in the west, the sacred Buddhist area of the Beyul Khenpajong in the north, and the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in the east. (The wildlife sanctuary, which doesn’t sit on the border, only appeared in Chinese demands in 2020.) These claims reflect Beijing’s bad-faith negotiating, which has marred talks between the two countries since they began in 1984. It’s clear why neither side has made progress through negotiations, despite meeting frequently over the years.

   Since 1996, China has offered an exchange of territory with Bhutan, seeking to relinquish its claim to disputed regions in the north in exchange for Bhutan ceding more strategically important territory in the west. For Beijing, Doklam remains the goal: It sits at a junction that connects Tibet, Bhutan, and India, and it would provide the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a tactical advantage. To make this a more attractive proposition, China noted that the territory in the north was far larger than the territory it sought. Although the initial offer nearly worked, the 1996 talks ultimately broke down.

   Bhutan’s unwavering refusal to accept the deal may have prompted China to add the Sakteng claim, sending a message about how far it will go. Meanwhile, China has stepped up its coercive measures and opted for more creative means of reaching a breakthrough. This began with border incursions, which escalated significantly in the 2000s before transitioning to the rapid construction of cross-border civilian and military infrastructure. As Robert Barnett reported in Foreign Policy in 2021, China erected entire villages inside Bhutan’s borders in recent years; Gyalaphug village in the northern Beyul region is one of three the Chinese have constructed, along with miles of roads, CCP administrative centers, and outposts for military, police, and other security officers.

   Such an elaborate construction drive may seem to contradict China’s apparent preference for the western regions, including its offer to exchange the very land on which it has built villages. But this view misunderstands the CCP’s motive: Rather than annexing Bhutanese territory to occupy it fully, the CCP’s main objective seems to be to strike at the core of Bhutan’s Buddhist culture. As Barnett wrote, Bhutan ceding the Beyul region—an area of immense cultural and religious importance—is as likely as Britain giving up Stonehenge. The silent occupation is instead intended to force the hand of the Bhutanese leadership, making it more eager to discuss the future of Doklam.

   The status of Doklam is ultimately a trilateral concern. Bhutan and India have shared a special relationship since signing a treaty of friendship in 1949, which afforded India guidance over Bhutan’s foreign and defense policy; they have maintained this connection even after the treaty was relaxed in 2007. In 2017, Chinese troops clashed with Indian soldiers in the region over a Chinese attempt to build a road connecting Doklam with Tibet. The disputed region represents a vulnerability for both India and China. To the south, Doklam borders the Siliguri corridor, a sliver of land that connects the heart of India to its northeastern regions. It is the only land route for Indian troops to reach territory including the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which was a major theater of conflict in the 1962 Sino-Indian war and where the two armies have clashed as recently as last year.

   Similarly, the Chumbi Valley to the north of Doklam—often described as a Chinese dagger into Indian territory—represents a weakness for China, which sees the ancient gateway to Tibet as vulnerable to a pincer movement, in which Indian troops could strike from both sides of the valley at once—from Bhutan and India. By extending its claim by 89 square kilometers south of the intersection with Bhutan and India, China hopes to gain a vantage point that could serve both offensive and defensive purposes in a potential conflict with India.

  China’s increased urgency toward border talks with Bhutan should not be seen in isolation. Resolving the dispute over Doklam is inextricably linked to the conflict on China and India’s shared border, and specifically to the status of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as an extension of South Tibet. With Doklam under its control, China could exert more pressure on India; Chinese forces could easily sever India’s connection to the eastern part of their disputed border. Such a resolution would also almost certainly precede more ambitious moves from China in Arunachal Pradesh, which could draw in the United States. (U.S. intelligence has already assisted the Indian military in previous border skirmishes.)

   The outcome of negotiations between China and Bhutan will loom heavily over the future of peace along the China-India border, as well as broader geopolitical tensions. Although the discussions are speeding up, China and Bhutan have not yet set a date for the all-important 25th round of boundary talks, where a significant breakthrough would be most likely. Looking west, the United States and India are actively deepening their ties; it appears inevitable that the Quad will have to bring military cooperation within its framework. With such high stakes, New Delhi should urge Thimphu to maintain the status quo in Doklam in the face of continued pressure from Beijing.

 

Marcus Andreopoulos is a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, an international policy assessment group, as well as a subject matter expert for the Global Threats Advisory Group at NATO DEEP.

(Foreign Policy Magazine)

 

Tribute To Sikkim’s Anti-Merger Heroes

          “History will look back to this era as Sikkim’s final hour”

   ‘Badmash,’ was his reaction to a newsitem in a Calcutta-based daily on himself and Sikkim. Obviously the Chogyal did not like the report. Most reports on the happenings in Sikkim in those days in national dailies were slanted and one-sided. There were only the two of us – my friend Hem Lall Bhandari and myself – when the Chogyal made the remark at the small lawn of the Palace adjacent to the office. This was in December 1979 or early 1980 – just before the two of us left for Bombay for our three-year law degree course.

   This was perhaps my first close encounter with Palden Thondup Namgyal – the 12^th Chogyal of Sikkim and the man that I deeply admire and respect.  I don’t remember saying anything to him except perhaps to wish him a Happy New Year. The last time we – Sikkimese students in Bombay – met the Chogyal was with Prince Wangchuk at a hotel in Bombay towards the end of 1981, where he had invited us for dinner. It was a quiet affair – perhaps too quiet and solemn. That was perhaps the last time that we got to meet him. He left for medical treatment in the US shortly and died in a New York hospital on January 29, 1982.

   Beginning from early 1973, when political upheaval rocked the tiny Himalayan Kingdom, the Chogyal suffered and endured great personal and political losses. He lost his crown in 1975; his first-born son Prince Tenzing in 1978 in a car accident; and finally his wife and almost his two youngest kids in 1980. Dethroned and betrayed by his close associates and friends, the Chogyal was forced to live in isolation and solitary confinement in his Palace in Gangtok for a long, long time until he passed away at the age of 59. His greatest gift to us is that he did not give his ascent to the ‘merger’ despite tremendous pressure to do so.

   Those who ditched him included teacher-turned-politician Nar Bahadur Bhandari, who with the Chogyal’s help, formed the anti-merger Sikkim Janata Parishad Government on October 18, 1979. After he came to power Bhandari’s close associate and Parishad leader and legislator Lal Bahadur Basnet, the party’s spokesman, surprisingly declared: “Merger is a fait accompli”, meaning there was nothing that could be done to undo what was done. It was a very convenient statement to stay in power; it smacked of betrayal.  And there ended the hopes of the people on Bhandari, whose party came to power on an anti-merger platform after defeating LD Kazi’s pro-merger party.

   And yet – despite the letdown – I  still stand by on what I had written about Bhandari in my Spotlight on Sikkim in early 1984: “The victory of Bhandari’s Sikkim Parishad in 1979 elections symbolized the triumph of anti-merger forces, whose main objective can best be expressed in three words – ‘Sikkim For Sikkimese’ …Though Bhandari has long abandoned the cause of the people, his final departure from the post of chief ministership (in May 1984) symbolizes the end of an era, which could best be described in the words of Tennyson” ‘To strive, to find, and not to yield.’ Perhaps history will look back to this era and recall this period as Sikkim’s “final hour.” Bhandari then will not be remembered for the wrongs he has done but for the things he hoped to do and for the dreams he set out to fulfill.”

   Lachen Rinpoche was a young man when India began mobilizing its forces to take over the Himalayan kingdom in early 1970s. He – perhaps being one of the few Sikkimese tulkus – was one of the Sikkimese nationalists who openly threw stones at central reserve police forces in Gangtok to oppose the takeover. Bhandari’s Parishad managed to win 16 of the 32 seats in the House and with Lachen Rinpoche’s help – he was the Sangha MLA  (independent) – the Parishad formed the government.

   Rinpoche passed away on September 18 last year (2012) after prolonged illness. His last wish was to build a statue of Guru Rinpoche, who visited Sikkim in the 8^th century, at the sacred Gurudongmar Lake in Lachen, North Sikkim. His Holiness the Sakya Trizin referred to Rinpoche as “one of the outstanding masters of his generation.”

   Athup Lepcha was a mere employee in the State forest department when Sikkimese nationalist leaders approached him to take on the merger architect – Kazi Lhendup Dorji Khangsarpa – in the 1979 Assembly elections from the Lepcha reserve of Dzongu in North Sikkim. Kazi – a Lepcha – thought Dzongu would be the safest constituency to return to the Assembly. But the Lepchas of Dzongu voted for Athup and gave a befitting send-off to the man who ‘sold’ Sikkim to its protecting power. Kazi bit the dust, settled in neighbouring Kalimpong after the humiliating defeat and finally died a lonely death.

   ‘Capt’ Sonam Yongda of the Sikkim Guards was – and still is – unflinchingly loyal to the Chogyal and Sikkim. He was unjustifiably jailed several times for standing up for his cause. The establishment – as in the merge era – still treats pro-Sikkim people as ‘anti-India.’ When will India realize that we mean no harm to it for being pro-Sikkim? Have we demanded independence? We have only asked for preservation of our distinct identity within the Indian Union.

   My friend Hem Lall Bhandari was just a student when he questioned the merger. He still continues to do so.  Why not? India’s own Prime Minister Morarji Desai said the manner in which Sikkim was merged was not right. Hem Lall’s decision to edit Pro-Sikkim English weekly recently reflected his love and dedication for Sikkim. It is very unfortunate and sad that those leaders who profess to be pro-Sikkim have not been able to utilize the services of Hem Lall and others like him who share the same conviction. By their action our so-called leaders have exposed themselves and shown who they really are.

   There are many, including people like Netuk Tsering, Martam Topden, DK Khati, Tholung Pipon, Kunzang Dorji, Basant Kumar Chhetri, Sherab Palden, Ugen Paljor Gyaltsen, MM Rasaily, whose contributions in opposing the ‘merger’ during and after the takeover must be appreciated and acknowledged. And there are many more – unknown and unsung heroes – who stood for Sikkim during its hour of trial and tribulation.

   The role of people like KC Pradhan and RC Poudyal during the ‘merger’ period has been misunderstood by many. They wanted democracy with greater political power for the majority Sikkimese Nepalese within the bounds of Sikkim and were against being part of the world’s largest democracy. They should not be blamed for what eventually happened to Sikkim. They were overtaken by events and became victims of circumstances and power politics.

   Long after the takeover, fake democrats who betrayed Sikkim and the Sikkimese people still continue to be rewarded and decorated just to please New Delhi. One of the unkindest cut that was inflicted on our anti-merger heroes was Sherab Palden’s felicitation on May 16, 2013 (merger day). It was a crude bid to tarnish his image; but it will not work. Our memories of the merger era are intact and agents of disunity, division and destruction will bite the dust one day.

  In this column I want to say how indebted and grateful we are to those who stood up, suffered and yet fought for preservation of Sikkim’s unique international status. I believe there are many who share my feeling on this.

   When I asked him several years back what his feelings for Sikkim was now that everything is over, noted journalist and columnist Sunanda K. Datta-Ray just said, “It is not my country” and left at that. And yet Datta-Ray’s book – Smash and Grab – Annexation of Sikkim – must go down in history as perhaps the only authoritative and authentic account of what really happened to Sikkim during the merger and why. Here is a worthy non-Sikkimese Indian who shared our burden and courageously informed the world the injustices we had to put up with. 

   When I met the author in Gangtok recently and asked him to autograph his book which I bought in 1985 he wrote: “With warm regards for a true and loyal son of Sikkim.” This was my reward for being pro-Sikkim and standing up against all odds all along – despite trying circumstances – from a person I respect.

   After his death the Sikkim Legislative Assembly, which during Kazi’s rule abolished the institution of the Chogyal, paid a tribute to the fallen hero in these words which were read out in the Assembly by its Deputy Speaker Lal Bahadur Basnet: “During the hour of his trial, when his very throne was at stake, Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal stood like a rock and sacrificed petty considerations for the lofty ideal he had espoused. He lost, but in the very process of losing his throne and status, he rose to his full stature. For when ‘little men’ who rule the roost in Sikkim will have been consigned to dust, posterity will look back with awe and respect upon the last representative of the House of Namgyal on the throne of Sikkim and say that Palden Thondup Namgyal bowed out of the political stage of Sikkim with the grace of a ruler and with the courage of a real man. He lost his Kingdom, but gained a martyr’s halo. And his descendents will be able to walk with their heads held high whatever their circumstances in life happen to be.”

  Indeed, all true sons and daughters of Sikkim will forever walk with their heads held high in the land of their origin no matter what all because of those who did not bow down when the easy thing was to give in to pressures and lures of a better life.

 

(Talk Sikkim magazine, June 22, 2013)

 

 

 

 

TRADE DIPLOMACY IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS

Date: July, 2006

Background to Indo-Tibet Trade through Sikkim

   After the conquest of India in mid-18^th century, the British penetrated into the Himalayas to find a way to China through Tibet. The initial intention of the East India Company for securing a way to the Celestial Empire was purely commercial though political ambitions would inevitably follow commercial ventures. The British soon found that Sikkim, not Nepal or Bhutan, offered the shortest and easiest route to Lhasa via Chumbi, a narrow valley which lay between Sikkim and Bhutan, and which, prior to 1890, was a part of Sikkim.

   After the annexation of Darjeeling from Sikkim by the British Government in India in 1860 Sikkim gradually came under greater British influence. To safeguard its interest in the eastern Himalayas John Claude White was appointed the first Political Officer in Sikkim in 1889. White first came to Sikkim in 1887, when he led the British forces from Darjeeling to Gangtok and forced the Chogyal (king) to abdicate his power. White formed his Sikkim State Council and took over the administration while the king was kept under house arrest.

  Road -building in Jelep La (10,877 ft) region in East Sikkim, which connects Tibet with Kalimpong in North Bengal, started soon after 1873 when John Ware Edgar, Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, was directed to investigate the possibility of re-establishing British trade with Tibet. Kalimpong was then a major trading center for trade with Tibet through Jelep La.  In 1886, when the Macaulay Mission obtained Chinese assent to conduct a mission to Lhasa, road and bridges were built up to Kupup near Jelep La. But due to opposition from the Tibetan side the Mission failed to proceed to Lhasa.

  The signing of the Anglo-Chinese Convention in Calcutta on May 17, 1890 marked a new era in Sikkim’s tumultuous history. The Convention, while making Sikkim a British Protectorate, also demarcated the present border of the former kingdom, which was founded in 1642 under the first Chogyal, Phuntsog Namgyal. The signing of supplementary agreement, Trade Regulations in 1893, led to the establishment of a trade mart at Yatung in Chumbi in 1894.

   It was during this period the British Government put pressure on the Tibetans to accept  Chinese ‘suzerainty’ over Tibet. The 1890 Convention and the 1893 Trade Regulations were ways in which the British sought to impose Chinese domination over Tibet for its own self-interest. However, when the British Government realized that Tibetans stubbornly refused to acknowledge China’s authority over Tibet and blocked the entry of British forces at the border it started direct negotiations with the Tibetans, leading to the signing of the Lhasa Convention in 1904. The Convention, while ratifying the 1890 Convention and 1893 Trade agreement, established two more trade marts at Gyantse and Gartok in Tibet.

   Road-building continued in the eastern border region adjoining Chumbi during the fateful Younghusband’s military expedition to Lhasa in 1905. Six years after Britain forcefully tried to extend its powers beyond the Himalayan frontiers the Chinese overthrew the 270-year-old Mind dynasty and in 1911 established a Republic in China. The rest is history. Both China and Tibet have much to thank Chogyal Thutob Namgyal and the Sikkimese for its tough resistance against British imperialism during this crucial period which witnessed the end of Britain’s expansionist policy in Asia.

   Border trade with Tibet, however, continued during this period and even after India’s independence in 1947, the Communist party’s takeover of China in 1949, and subsequent occupation of Tibet by China in 1959. It came to an abrupt end only in 1962 after the Sino-India conflict. The resumption of border trade with Tibet through Nathu La earlier this month  after forty-four years was indeed a historic event.

People-to-People Contact

   More than trade and commerce emphasis ought to have been given to people-to-people contact on the opening day of the resumption of the traditional trade route with Tibet through Nathu La (14,500 ft) on July 6, 2006. The peoples, particularly those residing in Sikkim and Tibet, have been forcefully separated for nearly half a century by outside powers and the historic occasion could have provided an ideal opportunity, though symbolic, for people to greet each other in a more humane and meaningful atmosphere. But this opportunity was lost forever as more attention was paid to officials, traders, mediapersons and the men in uniform. Apart from increased commercial activities and economic development the Sikkim Chief Minister, Pawan Chamling, while opening the historic Silk Route along with the Chairman of Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR), Champa Phuntsok, spoke of the need to re-kindle “emotional bonding of the peoples of the two countries.” Hopefully, this important aspect of Sino-Indian relations will be kept in mind in future interactions.

   What was more unfortunate was that even trading, the main activity in the present context, could not take off after the historic event as Indian traders did not possess the mandatory import-export code numbers (permanent account number – PAN). Even the quarantine center, required under the trade agreement, was found to be locked on the trade mart at Sherathang on the Indian side of the border. As a result, the first two truckloads of animal products brought over from China on July 11 were returned much to the disappointment of the Tibetan traders. These lapses cannot be condoned so easily as mere “bottlenecks” and “teething problems” as greater issues such as national security are also at stake as we embark on a new journey into Sino-Indian relations.

   When trade flourished through this route before 1962 conflict Sikkim was a Buddhist kingdom ruled by the Chogyals, whose ancestors originally came to Sikkim from eastern Tibet in the 13^th century. Besides the three ethnic communities – Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese of Sikkimese origin – Sikkim has a fairly sizable population of Tibetans and Chumbipas, Dopthapas and Tromopas, who are originally from Chumbi.

Trade and Tourism

   More than trade, tourism offers better scope for people-to-people contact and speedy economic development in this part of the world, which is yet to be explored. Both the Chinese Ambassador, Sun Yaxi, and Sikkim Chief Minister hinted on introduction of a bus service between Lhasa and Gangtok in the near future. Yaxi, who was present in Nathu La on July 6, went on to say that the possibility of starting a Lhasa-Gangtok bus service has been discussed at the highest level by the two countries. While Lhasa is 460 km from Nathu La  the distance between Kolkata to Gangtok is 497 km. The Ambassador also pointed out that development of tourism would follow once the trade links are firmly established.

   The Sikkim Chief  Minister, who recently paid a month-long visit to Europe to study the prospect of developing Sikkim as a major tourist destination, said “Since Sikkim is located centrally at the Buddhist circuit, which includes Bhutan, Nepal, Lhasa, Myanmar, and Arunachal Pradesh and Bihar, the State is undoubtedly going to be one of the most fascinating places.”  Besides tapping the enormous tourism potential in the region the “historic” resumption of the traditional trade route is aimed at “turning this route into the cultural highway that brings cradles of ancient civilization closer.”

   His Holiness the Dalai Lama came via Nathu La (meaning listening ears) in 1956 to attend the 2500^th Buddha Jayanti celebrations in India and two years later in 1958 India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, who had a fascination for the hills and hill people, travelled through Nathu La and Chumbi to enter the landlocked kingdom of Bhutan on a horseback. In the 8^th century, Lord Padmasambhaba, locally referred to as Guru Rinpoche (Precious Master) and widely regarded as the Second Buddha, established Buddhism in Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim. It is, therefore, befitting that this ancient route to Tibet, be reopened on Guru Rinpoche’s day (Tse Chu – 10^th day of 5^th month in Tibetan lunar calendar) and the Dalai Lama’s 71^st birthday. It would be a great occasion if the Tibetan spiritual leader was to return to his homeland via Nathu La when the Chinese Government formally gives assurances on his demand for ‘genuine autonomy’ for Tibet and invites him back to where he belongs.

   The opening of the Beijing-Lhasa railway service on July 1, a week before the resumption of the Nathu La trade route, seems significant. In due course, Shigatse, a major commercial center south of Lhasa, and Yatung, which fall on Lhasa-Nathu La route, will have rail links from the Chinese side. If relations between the two Asian giants improve then there is the distinct possibility of reopening trade routes with Tibet through Lachen and Lachung in North Sikkim and also Jelep La, an alternative route to Tibet near Nathu La. Both West Bengal and Sikkim stand to benefit if the Jelep La route is reopened. Says the Chinese Ambassador, “Border trade is a way of resolving the outstanding issues between India and China”. The two countries would surely open up more trade routes when relations deepen through frequent interactions.

Local Aspirations and Strategic Location  

   The recent decision to construct two-lane highway between Gangtok and Nathu La (distance 53 km and two hours drive) at an estimated cost of Rs 200 crores by the Border Roads Organization (BRO) and the construction of 608 km road network along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from Ladakh to Arunachal Pradesh, passing through Sikkim, are all positive indications of the building up of a closer and more friendly ties between India and China. Besides facilitating better road network in the entire Himalayan frontier road construction on LAC has been prompted by strategic considerations. India wants to strategically counter the Chinese build-up of road and rail links along the border in Tibet and be prepared to meet any eventuality. What happened after Hindi-Chini-bhai-bhai euphoria in the fifties cannot be forgotten so easily even if both India and Chinese aspire to let bygones be bygones. While a note of optimism has indeed been struck on Sino-Indian relations New Delhi needs to tread cautiously in dealing with contentious issues in the coming days.

   More than anything else both the countries need to give top priority to local concerns raised by people of Tibet and Sikkim. The Sikkim unit of the Indian National Congress (INC) objected to resumption of Indo-Tibet border trade through Sikkim before fulfilling the long-pending demand on restoration of the political rights of bonafide Sikkimese. The Sikkim Bhutia-Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC), an umbrella organization of the State’s indigenous Bhutia and Lepcha tribals, has also harped on the same issue. Sikkim Pradesh Congress Committee President and former chief minister (1979-1994), Nar Bahadur Bhandari, once close to the late Chogyal, always maintained that India had violated assurances given to the Sikkimese during the ‘merger’ era in the 1970s, when it abolished seats reserved for bonafide Sikkimese belonging to the three ethnic communities in the Sikkim Legislative Assembly in 1979, four years after Sikkim’s absorption into the Indian Union. The apprehension over the increasing influx of non-Sikkimese and non-Tibetans in Sikkim and Tibet respectively are major issues which need to be taken seriously.

   Both India and China need to respect the hopes and aspirations of the Tibetans and Sikkimese if the two countries want to come together in a more lasting and meaningful way. For more than guns, cannons and diplomacy it is the faith, trust and goodwill of the people which will act as a catalyst for speedy economic development and formidable bulwark against any outside aggression.

  Even if both China and India have formally and symbolically accepted their political authority over Tibet and Sikkim they need to pay heed to what Charles Bell, Political Officer of Sikkim and a close friend of the 13^th Dalai Lama, once said: “…from India’s point of view, a happy Sikkim as buffer state would be of greater advantage than an unhappy Sikkim in India on one of her future international boundaries of great importance, which would be of disadvantage, indeed a danger to India.” This applies to Tibet, too.