LANDMARKS OF THE DECADE (1989-1999)

Though the Rising Sun Party under R.C. Poudyal’s leadership was a cause for worry for Bhandari before the November 1989 (Assembly) polls the party soon became ineffective after the elections with Poudyal opting to stay in Delhi instead of leading the Opposition in Sikkim. In retrospect, this was Poudyal’s greatest mistake and he never fully recovered after his party’s electoral defeat.

The next person who gave much hope to the people was A.K. Subba, who was then trying his luck in lottery business. After Subba became the PCC chief he did much to organize the party in the State and even held a meeting of the North-East Congress Coordination Committee in Gangtok in 1991. But Subba dithered when he was asked to choose between his lottery business and politics. He opted for his business concerns, where he was believed to have made quite a fortune, and lost his place in State politics. Had Subba captured the imagination of the people, who were looking for a saviour to save them from Bhandari’s dictatorial tendencies, his fortune may have risen and Sikkim’s contemporary political history could have been different.

A section of the local Press indeed played a very significant role in feeding the public with a variety of news and views during this crucial period. At times some local journalists displayed tremendous courage and professionalism despite threat to their life and properties. The fight for preservation of freedom of the Press in the State culminated in the protest rally by six local journalists in Gangtok on June 19, 1993.

The man who chose to keep mum but was carefully taking stock of the situation was Pawan Chamling, who was then a member of the Bhandari Cabinet. More than the rumblings within the backward classes it was the general disillusionment with Bhandari’s regime that inspired Chamling to try his luck for the top job. While Chamling tried to wean away the OBC supporters of the ruling party to his side, others, including the minority tribals, also sided with him.

When Chamling felt that it was the right time for him to come out he made his moves. Within weeks of his utterances such as “I’m a democrat, not a sycophant” in Sikkim Observer, Chamling was dismissed (in June 1992) from the Cabinet. After consolidating his position in the OBC-dominated belt of south and west districts Chamling finally came out in the open when in March 1993 he formed his new political outfit, Sikkim Democratic Front.

By mid-1993, anti-Bhandari and pro-democracy activists under Chamling’s leadership gained the upper hand. Chamling soon emerged as the sole representative of the suppressed Sikkimese people. But political development soon took a new turn in early1994 after the income-tax issue surfaced. The crisis finally led to the abrupt ouster of Bhandari from chief ministership in May 1994. Dissidents within the SSP plotted against Bhandari for his dubious stand on the income-tax issue, where the tribals deeply felt betrayed and let down by Bhandari and his MP wife.

For six months before the November 1994 polls Sikkimwitnessed a brief spell of Congress rule under S.M. Limboo, who became the dissidents’ choice for the chief minister’s guddi. Limboo performed pretty well and paved way for a free and fair polls (November 1994) in which the SDF emerged victorious. Bhandari was finally ousted from power after he became CM in October 1979 on an anti-merger platform.

The electorate had given an anti-Bhandari verdict in favour of the SDF and Congress(I). While the SDF won 19 seats, 10 seats went to SSP, leaving Congress with two while one went to A.K. Subba, who contested as an independent candidate. When Chamling formed the government on December 12 (1994) the expectations of the people were very high. In the last five years the Chamling Government did much to live up to its expectations but, by and large, the people felt let down.

The SDF has once again been voted back to power in the October (1999) elections. With 25 MLAs in the House of 32 to its side there is no reason why Chamling cannot put the house in order and provide political stability and economic prosperity to the people this time.

(Ref: Sikkim Observer, December 1999)

 

 

  SOW THE WIND AND REAP THE WHIRLWIND

(The Press Club of Sikkim conferred the “Khangchendzonga Kalam Puraskar 2012” award to journalist-cum-writer Jigme N. Kazi at a function in Gangtok on July 17, 2012. The following are excerpts from Kazi’s acceptance speech)

 “If we cannot uphold certain basic and fundamental values of human existence such as freedom, democracy, justice, self-respect and the rule of law we miss the opportunity that life offers to each one of us. The first indication of a society’s degeneration is when individuals live and work only for themselves. Sikkim is on the verge of being a dead and decadent society. Our constant efforts to camouflage ourselves will not work in the long run. We will be fully exposed when the time comes.

   We locals often distance ourselves from the byaparis, the business community, for encroaching into our economic and political rights and interests. Little do we realize that while they sell potatoes, tomatoes etc. we are the real byaparis. We have sold our king, our flag, our country, our distinct identity and political rights. Not content with this we are still selling our hills and valleys, our lakes and rivers, our land and people, our religion and culture, and worse of all our self-respect and dignity. Is it really worth sweating it out for such people?

(L to R) IPR Secretary KS Tobgay, Chief Guest CK Shrestha, Sikkim Observer Editor Jigme N Kazi, Press Club Advisor CD Rai, Press Club General Secretary Joseph Lepcha and Press Club President Bhim Rawat at the Press Club of Sikkim function in Gangtok on July 17, 2012.

   Me and my kind have lived through this bitter period in Sikkim’s history. In our efforts to fight for the common cause we have brought down five chief ministers and made four chief ministers in the past so many years.  We did this for a good cause and without any selfish motive. We are not to be blamed if our political leadership continuously fails us and lets us down the moment they come to power.

   I took leave from the Fourth Estate at the end of the year 2000 to make my personal contribution to Sikkim politics when I was convinced that those we backed were betraying us and the issues we raised for petty considerations. Unlike many others, I could not hang around and hide myself safe and secure in a small corner when I was convinced that we were being led to a dead-end street. I left active politics after three and half years in August 2004 when I was fully convinced that I was heading nowhere and those around me were still deeply involved in petty politics. There is no future for Sikkim and the Sikkimese if our political leadership – ruling and opposition – fails to rise above mundane things and continues to mislead the people while making great promises.

   It is futile to fight for the distinct identity of Sikkim within the Union if the leaders of our larger community are not sure of who they are, whom they represent, and what they really want. Nepal’s political situation, where ethnic communities are being reduced to a minority in the land of their origin, has still not opened our eyes. This is because while our head is still not clear our heart is full of greed. When will we ever live in a place where the mind is without fear and the head is held high? When will this non-stop looting stop? Corruption has reached a point of no return. Disillusionment has set in and this seems to be irreversible. These are dangerous trends in a sensitive and strategic border State like Sikkim.

   Even if our political leadership has failed us time and again, India must live up to the expectations of the Sikkimese people. If it continues to ignore the hopes and aspirations of those who sacrificed their country so that this nation may live in peace and security there may come a day when Sikkim will become a hot-bed of international politics. We may not see that day but that day is not afar if India fails to honour its commitments made to Sikkim and the Sikkimese people during the takeover.

   The gradual dilution of our distinct identity, political rights and social harmony originates from New Delhi. The erosion of our unique and distinct cultural identity, the systematic manner in which seeds of division are sown in our social fabric, and finally the destruction caused to our fragile environment and ecology cannot and must not be easily condoned. We cannot blame our leaders only; we, too, have shamelessly become agents of division, disunity and destruction. We have sown the wind; we will surely reap the whirlwind.”

 

 

 

 

 

 

OSU FAVOURS ST STATUS FOR ALL SIKKIMESE

“Distinct Identity Within The Union”

Though it has not yet taken a formal decision on the issue, the Organisation of Sikkimese Unity (OSU) has taken a serious note of the demand for Scheduled Tribes status to all bonafide Sikkimese belonging to the three ethnic communities in the State who were genuine subjects of the erstwhile kingdom.

   Presently, only the minority Bhutia-Lepchas have been enlisted in the Scheduled Tribes list as per the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1978. The inclusion of all former ‘Sikkim Subjects’ belonging to the three ethnic groups of Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese in the State’s ST list will not only ensure peace, unity and harmony in the State but will also go a long way in improving the economic and educational welfare of bonafide Sikkimese.

   The division among Sikkimese Nepalese on caste lines not only affects political stability in the State but also endangers national security in this sensitive region. The need to restore peace, harmony and unity along the Sikkimese is the need of the day. The OSU believes that forces of disunity will hamper preservation of Sikkim’s ‘distinct identity within the Union.’

   Though the OSU favours ST status to all bonafide Sikkimese, irrespective of caste and community, it is firm on political rights concerning restoration of Assembly seats to the Sikkimese. While the OSU may prefer economic benefits and facilities to be enjoyed by all STs in the State it wants seats in the Assembly to be reserved solely for the Sikkimese on the basis of them belonging to the three ethnic groups and not on the basis of them being scheduled tribes.

   This is aimed at preserving the distinct identity of the Sikkimese as per the terms of the merger and Article 371F of the Constitution, which reflects provisions of the May 8 Tripartite Agreement of 1973 and Government of Sikkim Act of 1974.

   The Sikkim Newar Guthi (SNG), headed by the former Chief Secretary, Keshav Chandra Pradhan, as its President, recently urged the Sikkim Bhutia-Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) to demand inclusion of all Sikkimese in the list of Scheduled Tribes in the State. Pradhan believes that declaration of all Sikkimese in the list of STs in the State will “reweave the fine Sikkimese fabric and bring about a trust, amity and goodwill among all sections of the community so vital in this sensitive border State.”

   In his letter, dated Sept 6 1999, to the SIBLAC Convenor, Pradhan pointed out that mutual trust and harmony in the State “was in fact the basic spirit and objective behind the Article 371F when it was initially framed.” Though SIBLAC has not yet responded to the Guthi’s initiative the OSU has taken the matter seriously and will soon take a firm decision on this issue. It must be noted that while other social organizations kept mum, choosing to take sides with political parties during the recent elections, the Guthi took a principled stand and openly supported SIBLAC’s demand for restoration of the political rights of the minority Bhutia-Lepchas in the State.

 In response to the appeal made by SIBLAC on the seat issue, OSU leaders helped to form the Sikkimese Nepalese Apex Committee (SNAC). The OSU feels that the seat issue should now be fought jointly by both the minority and majority communities.

(Ref: Sikkim Observer, 30 October 1999, Sikkim For Sikkimese: Distinct Identity Within The Union,  Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, Gangtok, 2009)

 

 

  

 

OCTOBER 2, 1999 HUNGER STRIKE ON ‘NO SEAT, NO VOTE’ ISSUE

Just days before the scheduled date of the proposed hunger strike on October 2, 1999, the OSU and SIBLAC formed the Sikkimese Nepalese Apex Committee (SNAC) in Geyzing, West Sikkim. The new body was formed at a joint meeting of the OSU and SIBLAC and was chaired by K.C. Pradhan. Buddhilal Khamdak, a young and educated Nepali from the Limbu community in West Sikkim, was made the SNAC’s Convenor. The newly-formed body supported the seat issue demand raised by the SIBLAC and OSU and urged the two organisations to support the demand on restoration of Assembly seats of the Sikkimese Nepalese.

   On October 2, while the rest of the nation celebrated the 130th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi (Gandhi Jayanti), the Sikkimese people – represented by SIBLAC, OSU and SNAC – sought the blessing of the ‘Father of the Nation’ and the Guardian Deities of Sikkim in their struggle on restoration of their political rights. The 12-hour hunger strike by six representatives of the three ethnic communities at the ‘BL House’ in Gangtok on October 2 symbolically ushered in a new phase in the fight for restoration of the political rights of bonafide Sikkimese belonging to the three ethnic communities.  Four members of the SIBLAC – two convenors (Nima Lepcha and Pintso Bhutia), Vice-Convenor Tenzing Namgyal, and a woman representative (Gyamsay Bhutia), the SNAC Advisor K.C. Pradhan and myself as OSU Chairman took part in the historic one-day hunger strike on October 2, 1999.

The 12-hour hunger strike by Sikkimese representatives at the ‘BL House’, Gangtok, on October 2, 1999.

(Left to Right) Tenzing Namgyal, Jigme N Kazi, Nima Lepcha, Pintso Bhutia, KC Pradhan and Gyamsay   Bhutia.   

   We had actually chosen the premises where the ‘Statues of Unity’ are installed for the venue of the one-day hunger strike. Located in the heart of the capital at the northern end of the Mahatma Gandhi Marg – the main market area in the capital – this venue would have been the ideal place to begin a prolonged and intensive campaign on the seat issue. However, the State Government refused to allow us to use this place. In fact, it asked us to call off the hunger strike and the boycott call.

   In a letter to the SIBLAC, dated September 17, 1999, Chief Secretary Sonam Wangdi said redressal of grievances should be done through participation in the electoral process and pointed out that boycott of elections “is the last action to be taken as the final resort when all other means have failed.” The Chief Secretary simply could not see that we had resorted to this method as “all other means”, including the electoral process, in the past two decades failed to achieve the desired result. We ignored the government’s plea and went ahead with the hunger strike.

   However, it must be placed on record that if it hadn’t been for the OSU the hunger strike and boycott call may have been put off. Pradhan and I tactfully and very firmly exerted enough pressure on the SIBLAC leadership, which was dithering on the issue at the last moment when they were under extreme pressure. Even if the SIBLAC had backed off at the last moment the OSU and SNAC would have certainly continued with the mission. No amount of tactics and pressure would work on Pradhan and me and on this we were very confident.

   As planned, we held the hunger strike on October 2 to remind the world that we were determined to struggle on till our demand on restoration of our political rights were met. While others fought the elections we fought for our people. We were not concerned with who wins or loses in the polls; our main concern was that if the Assembly seats were not restored to us in the near future we would be the ultimate losers and the electoral process would then become a meaningless ritual as the Sikkimese people would have no future to look forward to.

 

(Ref: The Lone Warrior: Exiled In My Homeland, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 2014.)

TIBET AND SIKKIM DID NOT ACCEPT 1890 CONVENTION

Sir Charles Bell, Britain’s Political Officer in Gangtok with additional responsibility for Tibet and Bhutan, called the Chumbi Valley, where the Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in a tantalising minuet, “a dagger aimed at the heart of India.” Vincent Coelho, independent India’s much later official in the same position, claimed “that India’s frontier with China is the Chumbi Valley and the crest of the Himalayas along Sikkim’s northern border with Tibet.”

Chumbi Valley

Strictly speaking, India is not involved in today’s dispute over the Doklam plateau where the Chinese are said to claim 269 sq km of Bhutanese territory. But Jawaharlal Nehru’s warning in the Lok Sabha in 1959 “We have publicly, and rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan, if they are attacked. It is very necessary for us to understand that if anything happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as an interference with the border of India” still shapes policy. Doklam is one of the four disputed areas in Haa and Paro in western Bhutan. Haa Dzong (Castle) is the family seat of the once powerful Dorjee clan of the half-Sikkimese Ashi Kesang Wangchuck, whose grandson, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, is the current “Dragon King.” Haa is also the headquarters of the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan and, therefore, an object of Chinese suspicion. India’s southernmost military post is at Dokolam on the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction.

The kings (Chogyals) of Sikkim had their traditional seat in the Chumbi Valley. It was the subject of prolonged Anglo-Chinese negotiations in the late 19th Century when Sheng Tai, the Manchu envoy, not only had to contend with Lord Lansdowne, the viceroy, who himself argued Britain’s case, but was also under the influence of his British secretary. The crumbling and corrupt Celestial Empire was in no position to resist such high-powered pressure, and the negotiations ended in the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 which affirmed Britain’s protectorate over the Kingdom of Sikkim, and gave the Chumbi Valley to China.

    The Chogyal of Sikkim and Bhutan's Ashi Phuntsho Choden, Thimphu, Bhutan.

Neither of the two principals, Sikkim and Tibet, was consulted. The protesting Tibetans announced they did not recognise the Convention, as did Sikkim which clung to her title to the Chumbi Valley. Legally, the Convention was of doubtful worth. In practical terms, it was irrelevant, for the exercise of British power mattered far more than fudged legality. With or without the benefit of Chinese acknowledgement of British pretensions, the Viceroy did as he pleased in the Himalayas.

It was an age when all Asia deferred to the white man. Stirring events, including the only major engagement the British ever fought in Sikkim, preceded the Convention. The Tibetan army was finally pushed back through Jelap-la in September 1888, and the Derbyshire regiment poured into Chumbi to ransack the “large three-storied rambling building… rich with valuable and curious China, costly arms and all sorts of quaint curiosities” that was the Chogyal’s palace.

It suited British strategy to act on the assumption that Tibet was subject to China. That way, the Tibetans could not threaten British actions in the Himalayas while an enfeebled China was no threat at all. The British again ignored Tibet’s rights in the trade regulation talks three years later, and insulted and imprisoned the Dalai Lama’s envoy, refusing to allow him any part in the negotiations. Claude White, then Political Officer, deliberately did not wait for Tibet’s representatives in 1895 when he erected boundary pillars at Jelap-la in the presence of three Chinese commissioners. These pillars along a 14,500-ft ridge gave, and give, India’s artillery an overview of the entire Chumbi Valley, including military fortifications and troop movements.

This is probably what the People’s Liberation Army is trying to correct. A road through the Doklam plateau along the eastern Bhutanese edge of the Chumbi Valley would counter the advantage the British gave themselves at Jelap-la on the Valley’s western Sikkimese border. China reportedly offered Bhutan a package deal in 1996 to exchange its claim to 495 sq km of land in the north-central sector of Bumthang in return for the 269 sq km in Doklam.

It seemed a wonder China did not ask for abrogation of the 1890 Convention as yet another “unequal treaty” forced on the dying Qing dynasty just as it repudiated or demanded renegotiation of many other treaties. One reason could be that it enshrined British recognition of the Chumbi Valley as Chinese. A no less vital reason with contemporary political relevance may be that it portrayed China as Tibet’s suzerain power. The historian John Rowland claimed, “Peking, which sees the Himalayan states as irredentist regions to be regained as soon as possible, also assigns to them an offensive role. They can be future bases for the subversion of India.” But this is to overlook modern China’s sophisticated diplomacy. Beijing already controls Tibet. It knows Sikkim is beyond its reach. Nepal is probably thought to be more trouble than it’s worth. Bhutan alone remains to be wooed.

Zhou En-lai sounded jubilant at his New Delhi press conference on 30 April 1960 when he was asked about Chinese claims to Bhutan. “I am sorry to disappoint” he retorted. “We have no claim with regard to Bhutan, nor do we have any dispute with it. You may recall that in its letters to the Indian Government, the Chinese Government twice mentioned that China has no boundary dispute with Sikkim and Bhutan, and that China respects India’s special relations with Sikkim and Bhutan.” This is India’s version. According to China’s Hsinhua News Agency, Zhou said, “proper relations” (as in his note to New Delhi) and not “special” relations. The distinction is interesting for “special” is not always “proper.” Although Zhou dismissed the McMahon Line as “illegally delineated through an exchange of secret notes by British imperialism with the Tibetan local authorities of China,” he did not, for the reasons already suggested, denounce the 1890 Convention as another fraudulent imposition.

But, presumably, China seeks to improve on its gains from the Convention. Hence, the PLA’s attempt to build a motorable road “inside Bhutanese territory” from Dokala in the Doklam area towards the Royal Bhutanese Army camp at Zornpelri. Having reportedly already built what the Bhutanese media calls “a major road till the Yadong town in the Chumbi Valley,” the Chinese are apparently trying to take it as close as they can to the Indian and Bhutanese borders. India is paranoiac about security in the region. One of the reasons why the late King Birendra of Nepal lost New Delhi’s favour was his proposal for a six-point zone of peace that would, in India’s view, bring the Chinese right down to the Nepal-India border. Neither Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck nor his ministers will make a similar mistake.

(Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Free Press Journal, July 8, 2017, Sons of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Notion Press, 2020.)

 

STEPPING OUT TO SET THINGS RIGHT

For the true Sikkimese, May 16, 1975 heralded the end of an era and perhaps the beginning of a new struggle to preserve ‘Sikkim for Sikkimese’; but, this time, within the bounds of India, a great nation ruled by petty politicians and corrupt bureaucrats. This was an ideal that inspired me and shaped the course of my life ever since I returned to my native land at the end of 1982 after nearly twenty years.

   To aim high, think big and struggle for a worthy cause – for unity, identity and a common destiny for all people in Sikkim – was the agenda that I had set for myself both in my profession and later on in politics. Anything less than that was totally unacceptable to me and not worth the risk, toil and the endless struggle that lasted for more than two decades.

   By the end of 1999 – the last year of the 20th century – I felt a certain sense of restlessness and impatience that I hadn’t experienced before. I needed and wanted to step out of the narrow confines of my profession and free myself to openly and directly place my views to the outside world on certain issues of public interest which were close to my heart and which guided my professional and political outlook for a long, long time.

   Journalism does not allow you to mingle personal feelings and political inclinations with professional duties. The respect that I had for my profession had one disadvantage – it became a wall between me and my people. While freeing me in some ways it also enslaved me. I could not remain in the cage any longer – I needed and wanted to come out and set myself free. I could not and would not allow my precious dream to die in the hands of petty politicians without getting personally and politically involved in the struggle towards achieving my goals.

  Even if I face defeat my effort and struggle to pursue my dream would be worthwhile. I will not feel guilty of playing it safe and shying away in my neat little corner when the ideal thing to do was to come out in the open and take your stand - come what may!  Those who knew me well, respected me, and had great faith and trust in my capacity and commitment had no doubt about the honesty of my heart and the righteousness of my cause that drove me to place my case to the outside world.

   It was US President Theodore Roosevelt who once said: “The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena - whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood...who knows the great enthusiams, the great devotions - and spends himself in a worthy cause - who at best if he wins knows the thrill of high achievement - and if he fails at least fails while daring greatly - so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory or defeat.”

   In the autumn of 1999 I found myself in direct confrontation with the political establishment on issues that were close to my heart for a long time. You either take a stand and live out your dream or just talk about it, write about it but actually do nothing about it and spend the rest of your days regretting for not having spoken up and making your stand clear to the whole wide world. The fact is you are what you do and not what you want to do. The road to hell is certainly paved with good intentions. Our leaders who preach and do not practise should know where we are heading.

   In mid-September 1999, I, as the Chairman of the Organisation of Sikkimese Unity (OSU), supported a call for boycotting the ensuing Assembly elections in the State, scheduled for October 3, 1999. Though I had written about it earlier we actually did not make any plan to take such a radical step on the Assembly seat reservation issue. It just happened – quite spontaneously and to my great delight! The boycott call given by the Sikkim Bhutia-Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) – the apex body of the indigenous Bhutia-Lepchas in the State – was in reaction to the betrayal of people’s trust by the combined political leadership of the State and the Centre on the Assembly seat issue.

   The 1999 Assembly polls was the fifth Assembly elections in Sikkim since the arbitrary, undemocratic, unjust and abrupt abolition of Assembly seats reserved for the three ethnic communities in 1979. Not only were the political parties in the State fooling the people on the seat issue the Centre also refused to respond favourably and timely on the demand for restoration of the political rights of the Sikkimese people as per assurances given to them during the merger, which are reflected in the historic Tripartite Agreement of May 8, 1973 and Article 371F of the Constitution.

(Ref: The Lone Warrior: Exiled In My Homeland, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 2014.)

 

PALACE-PRADHAN BID TO SAVE SIKKIM

 Talks between the Palace and the leadership of the Sikkim Congress headed by Pradhan led to a dramatic development within the ruling party. It culminated in the passing of a controversial resolution aimed at safeguarding Sikkim’s separate identity – symbolised by the Chogyal and the national flag – and reducing the powers of the Chief Executive.

KC Pradhan

   In a letter dated March 12, 1975 to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, twenty-nine of the thirty-two legislators (excluding Kazi, Khatiwada and Kalzang Gyatso of the Sikkim National Party), demanded that the Chief Executive be stripped from his powers and be made an adviser to the Sikkim Government in the “interests of smooth running of the administration and consonant with the dignity and prestige of the Sikkimese people,” transfer of three portfolios, vis. Home, Finance and Establishment from the Chief Executive to the Chief Minister; and removal of non-extension services of Indian officers who were in Sikkim on deputation.

(Left to Right) Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, B.S. Das and K.C. Pradhan.

   The resolution, while welcoming the Chogyal’s initiative on holding a “dialogue with the Chief Minister,” demanded the removal of three Indian offficers-on-duty (OSDs) – Jayanta Sanyal, K.M. Lal, and Davy Manavalam – who played a vital role in favour of Kazi during this period.

    Unfortunately, Lal got hold of the document containing the 6 resolutions when only 18 Assembly members had signed. In the House of 32, only 17 members were needed to rectify past mistakes. Datta-Ray writes, “He (Lal) realised how explosive it could be. The men who were constantly being lauded in India as Sikkim’s first freely elected representatives, and as the Chogyal’s implacable enemies, the very leaders New Delhi was using as a human battering-ram against the palace, had given notice of their intention of going their own way. They did not want the chief executive or his lieutenants. They wanted full governing powers.” He adds, “They were even prepared to come to terms with the Chogyal. If their demands reached the press or Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi’s government K.C. Pradhan

would stand vindicated by the very process it had fostered, and rejected by the men it was sponsoring. The conspiracy would have to be nipped in the bud if New Delhi were to save the achievements of the previous two years. More, the possibility of recurrence would firmly have to be ruled out. That could only be done by removing the totems of Sikkim’s separate identity – flag, distinctive number plates, freedom from Indian taxes, PO, chief executive and the Chogyal; everything, in fact, that remained of a kingdom protected by treaty even if it was called an associate state.”

  Pradhan later (in 1990s) maintained that it was his Cabinet colleague, Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, who conspired with the Chief Executive and mischievously betrayed the Sikkimese people. According to him, Lepcha visited Pradhan’s residence at Development Area in Gangtok, swore that he would keep the resolution document a top secret, and took all the four copies of the six-point resolution, including the original. He then promptly handed over the documents to Lal, who knowing that the plot was chalked out at Kazi’s residence in Gangtok, promised him the Chief Minister’s post.

 

(Ref: Sons of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Notion Press, 2020.)