A MOVEMENT HAS BEGUN 

   I continued with publication of the Observer before, during and after the October 1999 Assembly polls. However, by then I was too engrossed with the basic and fundamental issues that concerned the people and didn’t care much for my professional duties nor the political fortunes or misfortunes of political parties and individual politicians. Sikkim was facing a deep political crisis and I was not prepared to sit on the sideline and let the future slip out of our hands.

   Improper and undemocratic selection of party candidates, imbalances in the selection of ethnic representation and Bhandari’s uncalled-for utterances against certain communities at the fag end of the campaign sealed the fate of the Opposition leading to the SSP’s humiliating defeat in the Assembly polls held on Oct 3. The SSP, which was expected to almost form the government, got only 7 seats, while the rest of the 25 seats went to the SDF. Poll prospects of the parties before selection of candidates favoured the SSP. However, Bhandari dug his own grave by going against the BLs and OBCs at the last minute.

Athup Lepcha

   As compared to the SSP, the SDF’s selection of candidates was not only better but more balanced on ethnic representation. Those who either do not understand or blatantly choose to ignore the intricacies of ethnic balance in Sikkim’s political and administrative set-up have never faired well politically. It was surprising that Bhandari had so blatantly and arrogantly ignored certain basic and fundamental factors in Sikkim politics. He paid dearly for it and his supporters and sympathizers were let down so badly because of his folly. And finally, Bhandari’s autocratic style of functioning and his arrogance, fueled by his sycophants, paved the way for his party’s defeat in the polls.

   At the height of his popularity before the polls Bhandari almost resorted to his old style of functioning. He ignored credible individuals and loyal party workers in preference to rank opportunists and sycophants. Bhandari-watchers and those around him who keenly observed his change of attitude and behaviour, which to a large extent reflected  his egoistic image when he was in power, were convinced that his five-year in the Opposition had not humbled the former ‘dictator.’ Many would have supported Bhandari  had he been a changed man; but since this was not the case they opted for Chamling, who was looked upon as the ‘lesser evil.’

   On October 10, 1999, a week after the polls, the OSU formed its first frontal organization – Sikkim Khukuri-Khorlo Movement (SKKM). Pradhan – now 63 and still going strong – was appointed President of the new body, whose main role and objective was to “spearhead the movement for restoration of the political rights of the Sikkimese”. The formation of the new body was well timed. It sent a clear message to the people and those in power that the OSU would not only continue with the seat issue but would adopt a more strident method to achieve its objectives.

   After Pradhan was appointed SKKM President by myself as OSU Chairman we hoisted the red and yellow flag of our organization in Gangtok for the first time. Till this point the khukuri (traditional weapon of the Nepalese) and the khorlo (wheel of dharma representing the BLs) remained a mere symbol of the organization. The wheel, which also represented the chakra in the national flag, also reflected the sentiments of ‘other Sikkimese’ in the State. Now, under the changed circumstances, it became the organization’s flag, symbolizing the unity and identity of the Sikkimese people. Formation of the SKKM was seen as a virtual revolt against those who let us down and were bent on coming to power irrespective of the irreparable damage done to the future of Sikkim and the Sikkimese. It not only reflected our commitment to the common cause of all Sikkimese but also our resolve to achieve our objectives.

KC Pradhan

   The Inner Circle of Sikkim (ICS) was first conceived in 1981 during my college days in Bombay. It took shape in the ’80s and surfaced only in 1994 when political instability rocked the State, leading to the abrupt downfall of the 15-year-old Bhandari Government. While the ICS was regarded as the think-tank and top policy-making body of the organization the SKKM became the OSU’s main frontal wing. The OSU remained as the main body of the entire organizational set-up.

   “With the formation of SKKM the movement for restoration of the political rights of the Sikkimese people will assume a new dimension. The SKKM will now take the initiative in ensuring the Sikkimese people’s participation in the democratic movement,” the OSU’s Press statement said on October 10, 1999, a historic day for the organization.

   Adopting different strategies to achieve its objectives, the OSU sought the help and cooperation of “all political and social organizations in Sikkim and all sections of the population in the State.” While stating that “Both the Central and State governments will also be taken into confidence in our sincere and genuine efforts to preserve Sikkim for the future generations of the Sikkimese people,” the OSU said it was “committed to observing peaceful, non-violent and democratic means to achieve its objectives.”

   By openly declaring that we would take everyone into confidence while going about our job we wanted to send a clear message to all concerned, including the State Government, that we were open to suggestions and ready to take help from any quarter. This message and our sincerity in dealing with the issue in the past so many years – sometimes under very difficult and trying circumstances – ought to have cleared all doubt and misunderstanding and opened channels of communication with all concerned parties, including the State Government and the ruling party.

   All parties – if they are really keen on solving our basic political issues – should and could have seized the opportunity, got our support and settled the issue once and for all. Our main objective was to solve the problem and get our demands met; we were not there to take credit for our efforts and our success. Many failed to understand this and this led to doubt, mistrust and misunderstanding. Those looking for personal and political gains on the issue either doubted our motive or refused to join hands with us as they feared being left out in the cold. Our credibility, competence and commitment to the cause made those who profess to also champion the same cause insignificant and insecure. This was indeed the main reason why they failed or deliberately did not cooperate and caused unnecessary obstacles in our fight for our survival. If you yourself are not trustworthy you also fail to trust others. In such a situation ‘common cause’ becomes the ultimate victim.

   Despite the OSU’s pledge that it would not take part in electoral politics in the State unless seats in the Assembly were restored to the Sikkimese, the political establishment had great doubt on us and tried to suppress our movement through devious means. It felt that if we – KC-Jigme combine (KC Pradhan is often referred to as ‘KC’) – succeeded  in our mission it would lead to the eclipse of many politicians and political parties which for a long time have been fooling and misleading the people on the said issue for their vested interests.

Jigme N. Kazi

   One of the top bureaucrats close to Chamling from the BL community tried to arrange secret meetings between Pradhan and the Chief Minister during this period. Why doesn’t Chamling want to meet me or for that matter the entire OSU team? Had Chamling done this he would surely have benefitted a great deal. The precarious situation we were facing made me write the editorial in the Observer in December 1999 under the caption “Sikkim’s Future: Agents of Disunity At Work”: “The move initiated by some senior bureaucrats from the minority Bhutia-Lepcha community on the demand for restoration of Assembly seats in the State is not very encouraging. Their negative attitude towards those who are genuinely involved in the movement for restoration of the democratic rights of the Sikkimese people as per the terms and spirit of Sikkim’s ‘merger’ reflects a colonial mindset and sycophancy that is gradually growing in the State administration. To please their political masters they are going against the hopes and aspirations of the Sikkimese people, who are looking for ways to safeguard their long-term rights and interests in the land of their origin.

   For nearly a decade and half after the ‘merger’ the legitimate rights of the Sikkimese people belonging to the three ethnic communities have been suppressed. Under the leadership of Pawan Chamling the Sikkimese people were successful in ensuring that a climate of fear was removed and the democratic process reinstated. Having fought for restoration of democracy in the State it is now the right and the responsibility of the Sikkimese people to openly and fearlessly come together and march ahead hand-in-hand for their ultimate fight to preserve the distinct identity of Sikkim within the Union.”

   The editorial added: “Any move to browbeat or suppress the Sikkimese people’s movement for a special place in the Indian Union cannot and must not be tolerated. All those who have an evil design and a hidden agenda for Sikkim will surely be exposed even as they consciously or unconsciously reveal their true nature. While adjustments can be made on minor matters there cannot be any compromise on basic issues that concern the Sikkimese people.

   The leadership of the Organization of Sikkimese Unity (OSU), which is spearheading the demand for restoration of all the 32 seat in the Assembly to bonafide Sikkimese belonging to the three ethnic communities, have rightly observed that they will not bow to the diktats of those who are unwilling to fight for the unity and identity of the Sikkimese people.

   What should rightly be brought to the notice of the public is the attempt made by some highly-placed bureaucrats to either buy off or cause a split in the organizations, including OSU, which are hell-bent on preserving Sikkim for the coming generations of the Sikkimese people. One senior officer pointed out that Revenue Order No 1 fully protected the interest of the minority community and it was unwise to demand restoration of Assembly seats for the original Bhutia-Lepchas in the State. Is this acceptable to the BLs? Certainly not. In a small State like Sikkim restoration of the democratic rights through seat reservation is the only weapon to ensure the survival of the Sikkimese against massive influx in the State.

   Another senior officer is making concerted attempts in causing disunity and misunderstanding among the OSU leadership. His attempts to arrange secret meetings with one of the OSU leaders with the powers-that-be is an indication that something is wrong somewhere. These developments must be viewed in the light of the Government’s attempts to crackdown on those who recently organized a 12-hour hunger strike on the seat issue on October 2.”

   The editorial reiterated its stand on the Assembly seat issue: “For the first time in the past twenty five years a serious and genuine attempt is being made by concerned citizens to respect the mandate given by the Sikkimese people on the seat issue. Ever since the abolition of Assembly seats reserved for the Sikkimese people in 1979 to this day the Sikkimese people have voiced their legitimate concern for their future survival in the State. “

   The editorial added: “A handful of politicians and bureaucrats cannot and must not be allowed to suppress the democratic urges of the Sikkimese people for their vested interests. The Sikkimese people will certainly be faced with many challenges in the near future. When a new situation comes into being and when the Sikkimese people are on the crossroad they ought to take note of who their real friends and enemies are. Sometimes wolves are clothed in sheep’s clothing. The time is nearing when the sheep and the goats will be forced to take their rightful place in society. To avoid any embarrassing situation the concerned authorities must fall in line and bow down to the wishes of the people. As the new millennium approaches Sikkim and the Sikkimese people will be given a new opportunity to redefine their place in the world’s largest democracy. What is needed is reconciliation and a more positive attitude to move forward together.”

(Ref: The Lone Warrior: Exiled In My Homeland, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, Gangtok, 2014.)

 

                               

                                  

                                       

 

 

 

INSIDE SIKKIM: IN THE NAME OF ‘DEMOCRACY’

FORWARD:

Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide is a journalist’s record of a heroic attempt to keep the flag of the Fourth Estate flying in a remote and difficult part of the country. Jigme N. Kazi’s trials, tribulations and occasional triumphs afford a remarkable test case for the “Freedom of the Press” in a natural environment setting rather than in the hothouses of the metropolises. At the same time, it brings into focus the carrot-and-stick mechanism to which media practitioners find themselves subjected to in many developing democracies.

   Democracy is a big word in Sikkim – in many ways bigger than in other states of the Indian Union. For, it was in the name of democracy that a protectorate monarchy was abolished and Sikkim absorbed with so much fanfare in 1975. But, did the merger actually bring democracy to Sikkim? If it did, it could not have come in any guise better than the travesty which passes for that great ideal in India. In the event, every ill that plagues the polity of the mother country is somehow exaggerated in Sikkim as if in some burlesque.

   Take corruption. Bureaucrats and politicians get away with greased palms everywhere, but what happens in Sikkim has to be seen to be believed. And if that government governs best which governs least, Sikkim must be the worst governed of places. For its outsized government overshadows everything. Big Brother-like, in a tiny State of some 400,000 souls – comparable to many small towns. In their anxiety to make Sikkim India’s 22nd State, the architects of the merger foisted entire ministries, secretariats, departments, a High Court and every possible trapping of paan-stained babudom on the unlikely setting of serene snow-capped peaks. Naturally, much of the Central funding meant for development was swallowed up by the monster of an unproductive government. As people sought sinecures, native skills such as in woodcraft, weaving and horticulture died out, making dependence on the jealous and unforgiving monster complete.

   With little incentive to be productive the government, instead of being a catalyst for development, became a mere distributor of Central largesse – either as salaries and benefits to supplicant employees or through contracts to the favoured. It did not take long for Sikkim to turn into a   breeding ground par excellence for that pernicious sort of vested interest that both feeds and feed on tyranny.

   A case so bad that the Assembly elections of November 1989 could be brazenly rigged to grab each and every one of the seats and the results claimed as a sign of popularity of leadership entering its third straight term. A lid was swiftly put on public protest. Representatives of the National Press, who witnessed the farce, such as myself, were told to leave in no uncertain terms. Jigme’s attempts to keep his highly credible Sikkim Observer going in the months after such enormity was like the proverbial battle between the elephant and the ant.

   Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide is much more than a journalist’s log. It is a status report on politics in Sikkim half a generation into the merger. It chronicles the role of crusty old Indian civil servants who, long after the departure of the British, got their chance to do a Colonial Blimp on a helpless little principality, complete with the bullying, obfuscation and “fair-play.” The mess they left behind is tangible in the multi-storeyed buildings that crowd each other off the Gangtok hillsides as the excrescence of diverted funds. Also in the abject misery of the people the funds were diverted from – presenting Indian-style ‘development’ at its worst.

   The book appears at a critical juncture in the history of the Indian Union and in the shorter history of Sikkim as a member. At a time when serious questions are being raised on Kashmir’s legally-correct accession to India, the annexation of Sikkim does not even have a fig leaf. China is yet to accord recognition for the merger of this strategic trip of high ridges with which it has a border as also has two other countries. More pressingly Sikkim has become a natural destination for millions of uncategorised Nepalese-speaking people pouring into the North Indian terai, Bhutan and the Assam valley and altering the demographics. What such a large floating group can do to tiny Sikkim with its minuscule population does not require any great feat of imagination.

ternally, Sikkim is in political turmoil whether or not the National Press has the time or space to report it. With Assembly elections only a year away opposition groups are once again braving political repression and custodial atrocities to take their popular protests into the streets – even violently. After New Delhi’s tame acquiescence to the outrageous rigging of the November 1989 Assembly polls, they have been left to their own devices – feeble grassroots workers fighting unabashed perfidy.

   But, forgotten in the games being played out on the far Himalayan slopes are the interests of the indigenous Lepchas, Bhutias, Limbus, Rais and genuine Sikkimese Nepalese, clamouring for what was promised to them on merger – protection from being submerged. More than anything else, Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide is the articulation of that clamour.

 

Ranjit Devraj

Correspondent

United News of India (UNI)

 

(Ref: Inside Sikkim: Against the Tide, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, Gangtok, 1993.)

 

Battle for Article 371F: Struggle And Triumph

The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment: Supreme Court of India, 1993.

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   “These are the times that try men’s souls. The summer solidiers and the sunshine patriots will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of his country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the conflict the more glorious the triumph.”

-Thomas Paine

   “…for without victory, there is no survival.”

-          Wintson Churchill

   “And I know that if you carry these words through to the end, it will be a victory…not just for you, but for something that should win, that moves the world…and never wins acknowledgment.”

-          Aryan Rand, Atlas Shrugged

 

     I began the new year on a positive note. I was convinced that 1993 would bring significant changes in my life. I have always been acutely aware of the fact that on completion of every ten years, new avenues and new opportunities seem to gradually unfold. And as I lay on my bed on the first day of January 1993, I was deeply conscious of the fact that the new year would bring something different in my personal and professional life.

   One of the most exciting and meaningful news for me in recent times came on February 10. We had won in the Assembly seat reservation case in the Supreme Court, which was kept pending for 14 years. The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgement on February 10, upheld reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas (BLs) and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly. The judgement also upheld the validity of the 36^th Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, which provided special status to ethnic and religious groups in Sikkim.  This historic judgement, delivered by a five-judge constitution bench on February 10, came as a great surprise to most people although some of us were expecting a verdict on the seat issue any time during that period.

   For me, the Supreme Court verdict was a personal victory. It was my first New Year gift! I felt a deep sense of satisfaction and security and was happy that our efforts to preserve our identity and retain our political rights had not gone waste. After nearly one and half decades of legal wrangle, we had finally triumphed. This was a significant achievement of historical significance.

   A five-judge constitution bench by 3:2 majority judgement upheld the validity of the 36^th Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1975, which provided special provisions in Article 371F of the Constitution to accommodate certain incidents of the evolution of the political institutions of Sikkim. The verdict also upheld the validity of an amendment to the Representation of People Act, 1950/51, reserving 12 seats for the minority ethnic Bhutia-Lepchas and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly.  The majority judgement delivered by the Chief Justice designate, Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, on behalf of Justice J.S. Verma and Justice K. Jayachandra Reddy and himself, upheld reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas and one seat for the Sangha in the State Legislative Assembly.

   Justice S.C. Agarwal, in a separate judgement, agreed with the judgement on the issue of reservation of 12 seats for the BLs, but differed on the issue of one seat for the Sangha. Chief Justice L.M. Sharma delivered a dissenting judgement and observed that reservation of as many as 12 seats for the BLs was disproportionate to the ratio of population of the BLs to the total population of Sikkim. Justice Sharma, who was to retire as Chief Justice the very next day (Feb 11), while striking down the seat reserved for the Sangha as unconstitutional, directed dissolution of the Assembly and called for fresh elections.

   The judgement delivered by Justice Venkatachaliah on petitions filed by Ram Chandra Poudyal and his brother Somnath Poudyal (now in the ruling SSP), while upholding the validity of Article 371F of the Constitution, observed: “The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment.”

    The apex court’s views, as reflected in the historic judgement, regarding Article 371F of the Constitution relating to Sikkim, noted: “Article 371F(f) cannot be said to violate any basic feature of the Constitution such as the democratic principle. From 1975 and onwards, Sikkim has been emerging from a political society and monarchical system into the mainstream of a democratic way of life and an industrial civilisation. The process and pace of this political transformation is necessarily reliant on its institutions of the past. Mere existence of a Constitution, by itself, does not ensure constitutionalism or a constitutional culture. It is the political maturity and traditions of a people that import meaning to a Constitution which otherwise merely embodies political hopes and ideals. The provisions of clause (f) of Article 371F and the consequent changes in the electoral laws were intended to recognize and accommodate the pace of the growth of the political institutions of Sikkim and to make the transition gradual and peaceful and to prevent dominance of one section of the population over another on the basis of ethnic loyalties and identities. These adjustments reflect a political expediencies for the maintenance of social equilibrium. The political and social maturity and of economic development might in course of time enable the people of Sikkim to transcend and submerge these ethnic apprehensions and imbalances and might in future – one hopes sooner – usher in a more egalitarian dispensation. Indeed, the impugned provisions, in their very nature, contemplate and provide for a transitional phase in the political evolution of Sikkim and are hereby essentially transitional in character.”

   The judgement added: “It is true that the reservation of seats of the kind and the extent brought about by the impugned provisions may not, if applied to the existing States of the Union, pass Constitutional muster. We are of the view that the impugned provisions have been found in the wisdom of Parliament necessary in the admission of strategic border State into the Union. The departures are not such as to negate fundamental principles of democracy.”

   Referring to the reservation of 12 seats for the Bhutia-Lepchas, the judgement said: “The degree of proportionality of reservation has to be viewed in the historical development and the rules of apportionment of political power that obtained between the different groups prior to the merger of the territory in India. A parity had been maintained all through. The provisions in the particular situation and the permissible latitudes, cannot be said to be unconstitutional.”

  The judgement further observed: “The provision in the Constitution indicating proportionality of representation is necessarily a broad, general and logical principle but not intended to be express with arithmetical precision. Article 332(3A) and 333 are illustrative instances. The principle of mathematical proportionality of representation is not declared basic requirement in each and every part of the territory of India. Accommodations and adjustments, having regard to the political maturity, awareness and degree of political development in different parts of India, might supply justification for even non-elected Assemblies wholly or in part, in certain parts of the country. The differing degrees of political development and maturity of various parts of the country, may not justify standards based on mathematical accuracy.

   Articles 371A, a special provision in respect of State of Nagaland, 239A and 240 illustrate the permissible areas and degrees of departure. The systematic deficiencies in the plenitude of the doctrine of full and effective representation has not been understood in the constitutional philosophy as derogating from the democratic principle. Indeed, the argument in the case, in the perspective, is really one of violation of the equality principle rather than of the democratic principle. The inequalities in representation in the present case are an inheritance and compulsion from the past. Historical considerations have justified a differential treatment.”

   Regarding reservation of seats for the minority Bhutia-Lepchas in the Assembly, Justice Agarwal in his judgement noted: “The reservation of seats of Bhutias and Lepchas is necessary because they constitute a minority and in the absence of reservation they may not have any representation in the Legislative Assembly. Sikkimese of Nepali origin constitute the majority in Sikkim and on their own electoral strength they can secure representation in the Legislative Assembly against the unreserved seats. Moreover, Sikkimese of Bhutia and Lepcha origin have a distinct culture and tradition which is different from that of Sikkimese of Nepali origin. Keeping this distinction in mind Bhutias and Lepchas have been declared Scheduled Tribes under Article 342 of the Constitution.”

   Justice Agarwal added: “The said declaration has not been questioned before us. The Constitution in Article 342 makes express provision for reservation of seats in the Legislative Assembly of a State for Scheduled Tribes. Such a reservation which is expressly permitted by the Constitution cannot be challenged on the ground of denial of right to equality guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution.”

   The Court also upheld the reservation of one seat for the Sangha in the Assembly on similar ground: “The Sangha, the Buddha and the Dharma are the three fundamental postulates and symbols of Buddhism. In that sense they are religious institutions. However, the literature on the history of development of the political institutions of Sikkim adverted to earlier tend to show that the Sangha had played an important role in the political and social life of the Sikkimese people. It had made its own contribution to the Sikkimese culture and political development. There is material to sustain the conclusion that the ‘Sangha’ had long been associated itself closely with the political developments of Sikkim and was inter-woven with the social and political life of its people. In view of this historical association, the provisions in the matter of reservation of a seat for the Sangha recognizes the social and political role of the institution more than its purely religious identity.”

   The judgement further observed: “In the historical setting of Sikkim and its social and political evolution the provision has to be construed really as not invoking the impermissible idea of a separate electorate either. Indeed, the provision bears comparison to Article 333 providing reservation for the Anglo-Indian community. So far as the provision for the Sangha is concerned, it is to be looked at as enabling a nomination but the choice of the nomination being left to the ‘Sangha’ itself. We are conscious that a separate electorate for a religious denomination would be obnoxious to the fundamental principles of our secular Constitution. If a provision is made purely on the basis of religious consideration for election of a member of that religious group on the basis of a separate electorate, that would, indeed, be wholly unconstitutional. But in the case of the Sangha, it is not merely a religious institution. It has been historically a political and social institution in Sikkim and the provisions in regard to the seat reserved admit of being construed as nomination and the Sangha itself being assigned the task of and enabled to indicate the choice of its nominee. The provision can be sustained on this construction.”

Thanking former Chief Justice of India, Justice MN Venkatachaliah , for the Sikkim verdict. 

   My report on the Supreme Court verdict carried in the February 14, 1993, issue of the Statesman, stated: “The verdict was widely welcomed by the people, particularly the tribals, who claimed that even after 13 years of legal and political onslaught against the community, the effort to abolish their reserved seats and take away their political rights had failed.” The feeling that we had at long last successfully defended our rights in the highest court of the land was shared by many people who celebrated the victory in their own quiet way as is customary among the Sikkimese   In invited Anup Deb, Chewang Tobgay and Sonam P. Wangdi, a Sikkimese lawyer who had contributed his share on the seat reservation case, for lunch at home soon after the news of the Supreme Court decision reached Gangtok. It was a quiet affair and all of us were genuinely happy over the outcome of the case. Members of our 1983-84 team, which fought the seat case in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Sikkim Tribal Welfare Association (STWA), an intervening part in the case, were Deb, Chewang and myself. The only person who was not present at my place was Jigdal T. Densapa, the former Home Secretary, who by then had retired from government service. Though officially representing the State Government – one of the respondents in the case – Densapa was very much part of our team.

   It was truly a well-deserved reward for those who had for a long time worked sincerely and painstakingly for the right cause. We knew that it was a victory not only for the Bhutia-Lepchas and the Sangha but for the entire Sikkimese people, whose rights and interests were protected under Article 371F of the Constitution.

   Those of us who were associated with the case were aware of the fact that Poudyal had really not lost anything in the case as he did not ask for reservation of seats for the Sikkimese Nepalese. Many people in Sikkim were under the impression that Poudyal, in his petition, had demanded restoration of Assembly seats reserved for the Sikkimese Nepalese. We had only ably defended ourselves against those who were determined to erase us from the face of the earth. I was convinced through this experience that no matter how long it may take, sincere effort and hard work for a good cause pays in the long run. I was also fully convinced that no power on earth can crush anyone if the people themselves fight and resist all forms of domination and exploitation with all the might at their disposal.

 

(Ref: Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 1993)

 

 

PANG LHABSOL

SOME THOUGHTS ON ‘PANG LHABSOL’

Worship of Khangchendzonga and celebration of Sikkimese unity must not be clubbed together.

By Jamyang Dorjee Chakrishar, Tibetan calligrapher and former civil servant

   We have seen that there are divergent views and explanation of the word "Pangtoe". Two main views; the first views believes that the word 'Pang' means 'witness' and that the Pangtoe Chham actually started as a celebration of the swearing-in of the great blood brotherhood of Bhutias and Lepchas at Kabi Lungtsok, North Sikkim, in the 13^th century, where Lord Gangs chen mzod lgna (Khangchendzonga) was a witness.

   The second view is that 'Pang toe' has nothing to do with the celebration of blood brotherhood at Kabi Lungtsok. It is a warrior dance performed by Pemayangtse Monastery, West Sikkim, and later at Tsuklakhang Monastery, Gangtok, in praise of Lord Gangs chen mzod lgna.

   Prior to the coronation of the first Chogyal Phuntsok Namgyal in 1642, Lhatsun Chenpo, the great Dzogchen master of Vajrayana Buddhism, who opened the ‘hidden land’ of Beyul Demajong (Sikkim) in the 17^th century, composed Dralha dpangs ༼དཔངས་བསྟོད༽ stoe or prayers for Gangs Chen mzod lgna and other deities of Sikkim and during the reign of Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal dpangs toe Chham was composed and performed. 

   Let us look at the spellings of the word in question. There are three spellings of the same pronounced in Tibetan. 1. spang སྤང་༼རྩྭ་སྔོན་སྐྱེ་བའི་ཐང་སྟེང་༽ Spang means land covered with green pastures, or reference as Pangri, Pang-shong 2. Dpangs. དཔངས་བསྟོད་༼མཐོ་བར་བསྟོད་པ། ༽ dpangs-stoe means great felicitation or prayer. 3. dpang དཔང་means witness

   Dra-lha spsngs-stoe དཔངས་བསྟོད་ is a regular prayer performed by the lamas of Sikkim. They based their prayer on sbrs-sjong-gney-gsol (prayer for sacred places of Sikkim) compiled by Taklung Gasi Rinpoche in consultation with Dilgo Khentse Rinpoche, Ja-drel Sangye Dorjee and which is published by the Palace in 1988. Jang-gter dra-lha dpangs-stoe 'gshen-phen-rol-pa' has the actual word spoken by Guru Padma Sambhava as revealed by Terton Rigzen rgoe-dhem and also words written by Lhatsun Namkha Jigme himself. Both these prayers mentioned Dra-Lha dpangs-stoe and clearly spelt out as 'dpangs-stoe', དཔངས་བསྟོད་ , meaning great felicitation or prayer.

   According to notes made by the Burmiak Kazi bKra shis dgra 'dul gdan sa-pa from the original manuscript preserved at Talung and appeared in 'Waddell, Buddhism,p.49' and also appeared in 'Oracles and Demons of Tibet' by Rene De Nebesky-Wojkowitz, p217 : When Lha-tsun-chenpo finally reached his destination (Dra-lha-gang at Dzongri), he performed a thanksgiving ceremony to all the deities of the country for his safe journey across the Himalaya; this tradition was annually repeated by Sangchen Pemayangtse Monastery and became more elaborate in the course of time. Further, this ceremony became more elaborate, until its present form, including the performance of the mask dance, was established by Phyagrdor rnam rgyal, the third ruler of Sikkim (1686-1717) in cooperation with the sprul sku Jigs med dpa bo, the third re-birth of Lha-Tsun-Chenpo.

 

To conclude:

   If we conclude sbrs-sjong-gney-gsol, the writings of Lhatsun Chenpo himself duly compiled and edited by by Taklung Gasi Rinpoche in consultation with Dilgo Khentse Rinpoche, Ja-drel Sangye Dorjee as authentic then the spelling of the word is དཔངས་བསྟོད་dpangs stoe (great prayer) and not དཔང་བསྟོད་dpang toe (witness prayer)

   I have not seen any reference where Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal decided to perform Pang Lhabsol celebrating the blood brotherhood pact at Kabi, an event that happened six generations ago. I am not ruling out completely the non-existence of such source. If Pang Lhabsol was meant to celebrate the great historical brotherhood pact then some references must be mentioned in the dpangs stoe cham yik or the text of the chhams (dance), which I learnt does not exist.

    Another interesting tradition is the arrival of a Mun or Bong-thing, a day preceding the Pang Lhabsol dance to the Palace. The Bong-thing goes into trance and possessed by the spirit of Thekong Thek, reminds the Chogyal of the great blood brotherhood pact and approaches the Chogyal for the fault his ancestors had committed as alleged by the Lepchas. The Chogyal has to assure the welfare of the Lepchas and request the spirit for the success of the forthcoming dance.

    Research needs to be done on whether the appearance of the Bong-thing preceding Pang Lhabsol started during the time of Chogyal Chakdor Namgyal and on whether the Bong-thing commanded the Chogyal to perform Pang Lhabsol to celebrate the brotherhood pact.

   My opinion: All said and done, if the composer of dPangs sToe or Pang Lhabsol Chham was to celebrate the unity of the Bhutia and Lepcha or appeasing the protecting deities for prosperity and unity of the people, the intellectuals of the present generation must collectively work to establish the fact to achieve the best purpose for which Pang Lhabsol was aimed and not pass on the confusion to the next generation.

   The division of opinion will further weaken the communities which are already in minority. The swearing-in of blood brotherhood of Bhutias and Lepchas at Kabi Lungtsok between Thekong Thek, the Lepcha chief, and Gya Bum sa, the Bhutia leader, was a historic event. Naturally, as a tribal tradition, such a big event must have happened by swearing-in or putting as a witness to the highest revered object of the country, which is Lord Gangs-chen-mzod-lnga. Therefore, there is, I think no dispute in this theory. The dispute is when we try to link this great historical event to the dpangs- stoe Chham during spangs Lha- sol.

   Kabi Lungtsok event plays a vital role in the restoration of pride and unity of the Bhutias and Lepchas. This historical brotherhood pact is of great significance, a binding factor between the two communities and giving a religious colour to it actually lessens its importance. This day deserves a separate national honor, depicting the unbroken lineage of 800 years of peaceful coexistence of Sikkimese people which is unique to Sikkim.

 

 

 

India invoking Buddha to counter China

Why Modi should meet Dalai Lama and get Karmapa back

Since New Delhi cannot militarily reverse the border situation, it is now demonstrating Buddhism as a native religion to India, even though there are more followers in China.

Jyoti Malhotra

26 April, 2023

   At the Global Buddhist Summit in New Delhi last week, the 87-year-old Dalai Lama exhorted his audience of monks from all over the world as well as the lay audience to focus on the heart of Buddha’s teachings “a combination of compassion and wisdom”, and invoked great Indian Buddhist scholars like Chandrakirti, Kamalashila and Shantideva to point to the enormous storehouse of philosophy and logic that still makes Buddhism one of the most attractive religions in the world.

   Only a few noticed that the Buddhist summit was held in the same cruel month of April—with due credit to T S Eliot—which marks the third anniversary of the standoff between Indian and Chinese troops on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. So just as the first Covid wave was taking over the country and Indian doctors were trying to deal with it, Chinese troops were climbing the plateau that ends in the LAC.

His Holiness the Dalai Lama addressing the congregation at the Global Buddhist Summit 2023 at the Ashok Hotel in New Delhi, India on April 21, 2023. Photo by Tenzin Choejor

   We know all this by now. We also know that the Chinese have been building major infrastructure, including a hot-mix plant that mixes up various materials to build roads, including an 11 kilometre-road on the its own side of the Depsang Plains. But it seems the Chinese are now unwilling to make any more concessions, which is why Indian troops can no longer patrol beyond the “bottleneck” in Depsang, which they used to do at least until 2014.

   This is also probably why the 18th India-China corps commander-level talks that took place this Sunday on the Chinese side of the Chushul-Moldo meeting point have yielded no results.

1959 Claim Line

   All eyes are now on the defence minister-level meeting under the aegis of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation on 27 April, where defence minister Rajnath Singh is expected to hold bilateral talks with Chinese defence minister Gen Li Shangfu. Officials say Singh is expected to forcibly raise the issue of the restoration of peace and stability on the Depsang Plains.

   Nothing much is expected to come from that conversation too. According to ThePrint columnist, Gen H S Panag, former army commander of the 14 Corps which is stationed in Ladakh, by disallowing Indian patrols in Depsang and insisting on buffer zones on the Indian side of the LAC, the Chinese have reached the “1959 claim line” that Chinese premier Chou-en Lai had then offered Jawaharlal Nehru as part of the border compromise.

The 16th Karmapa and Dalai Lama

   Nehru’s outright refusal gave way to the 1962 border conflict. Now, 60 years later, the Chinese seem to have achieved their aims on the ground, without bothering too much about the LAC and its various perceptions. Not that they are occupying “Indian territory,” or at least India’s perception of its territory—the Chinese are much too smart to do that. They have established control and they will rest for the time being. The buffer zones that have been established are intended to save face for India. The 1959 Claim Line was always intended to protect Aksai Chin and other areas that the Chinese forcefully took in 1962 and have kept ever since.

   Since it will be difficult for India to militarily reverse this situation, it has now decided to shift course and take a leaf out of Buddha’s teachings and marry them with ‘ahimsa‘ (active non-violence). Some would say that India has no alternative but to do this, which is true. It may not even amount to very much, unless Delhi takes other measures—such as taking the Dalai Lama into confidence and plan a few next moves. So last week’s Summit demonstrated that Buddhism is a native religion to India, even though there are more followers inside China. And as Prime Minister Narendra Modi pointed out during his remarks at the Global Buddhist Summit, the policy of ahimsa is a far better bet than the powerful moves made by the Communist Party of China globally.

   It’s not a bad strategy. Instead of allowing the Chinese to rudely underline its military manoeuvres, including in Ladakh, India is trying to shift global perceptions in favour of its traditional strengths – not just democracy, but also the democracy of religions.

   For two days at the Ashoka hotel last week, the jury was out in favour of the New Delhi-based International Buddhist Confederation. Monks in saffron and maroon and burgundy robes from all over the Buddhist world – from Mongolia to South Korea to Russia (about one million Buddhists are in Buryatia province) to the South-East Asian nations to Mexico, the US, Canada and Elsewhere – nodded and smiled and exchanged compassionate greetings. Only the Chinese, predictably, didn’t show up.

The Dalai Lama and the 17th Karmapa Ogyen Trinlay Dorji

   Over lunch on the second day, where the Dalai Lama sat at the centre of the long table, all the global orders exchanged notes with each other. Clearly, the Dalai Lama is a star—even though he is ageing, everyone wants a piece of him. Perhaps, it’s because he’s the only man the Chinese don’t really know what to make of. They can come right up to their 1959 Claim Line in Depsang and tie up the loose ends of History after nearly 60 years, but they cannot understand why this laughing monk commands so much influence not just inside India, but all over the world.

   Certainly, when the Dalai Lama passes on, the Chinese will produce their own man. That’s what they have done with the Gelugpa order’s second-most important monk, the Panchen Lama – which is a bit odd, considering the Chinese Communist Party doesn’t even acknowledge the idea of religion, let alone its place in the universe.

   PM Modi made sure that he and the Dalai Lama didn’t attend the meeting on the same day, and definitely not at the same time – perhaps Modi didn’t want to poke the Chinese too directly in the eye. The PM and the Dalai Lama have, indeed, met once, in 2015, and by all accounts the meeting didn’t go so well. Eight years later, though, as the third anniversary of the standoff in Ladakh is marked this April, it might not be a bad idea if Modi drops in on this very special Buddhist monk in Dharamsala – and ask him to lead the way towards world peace.

Missing Karma Kagyu link

  There was one big hole at the Buddhist summit last week – the absence of the Karmapa Lama, Ogyen Trinley Dorji, who left India in a huff some years ago and now lives in Germany or the US or both. It is high time that he is persuaded to return, and all the controversies related to him over the last few years should be settled amicably. If India is to become the leading light of Buddhist nations worldwide, the head of the Karma Kagyu sect cannot be missing.

   So, what’s it to be? Om mani padme hum, or Om bhur bhuva swaha – the Buddhist invocation or the Sanskrit one? Modi’s presence at the Buddhist summit demonstrated that the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has come to terms with the egalitarian nature of Buddhism. And since “unity in diversity” is India’s motto, both these prayers – and indeed, others – should not just be par for the course, but also on the same menu.

(Jyoti Malhotra is a senior consulting editor at ThePrint. She tweets @jomalhotra. Views are personal.)

 

 

ANALYSIS

China’s Border Talks With Bhutan Are Aimed at India

The disputed Doklam plateau is a pressure point for both regional powers. Beijing is moving in.

By Marcus Andreopoulos, a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation.

JULY 18, 2023

As tensions between China and India have grown in the last few years, the countries wedged between them are becoming more strategically significant. The two competing powers have sought a buffer between them ever since their founding—1949 in the case of the People’s Republic of China, and 1947 for India. Many scholars argue that it is this desire for a safety cushion that led to China’s 1950 invasion of Tibet. Today, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) efforts to manipulate democracy in Nepal have succeeded in shaping a government in Kathmandu that is more receptive to Beijing than to New Delhi. The CCP has also extended its reach to monitor and suppress the Tibetan community there.

   In recent months, China has also turned its attention eastward to its long-standing border dispute with the Kingdom of Bhutan. After years of so-called salami slicing along their shared border, as documented in Foreign Policy, China is attempting to engage in negotiations with Bhutan to formalize its ill-gotten gains—a strategy reminiscent of China’s playbook along its border with India and in the South China Sea. What is different is the strategic importance of Bhutan’s disputed regions to the China-India relationship.

   Chinese control of the disputed Doklam plateau would allow Beijing unhindered mobilization and more access routes in the event of military conflict with New Delhi. As a result, any China-Bhutan talks are not just a bilateral issue, but rather part of a Chinese strategy to gain a crucial advantage over India. A resolution between the CCP and the government of Bhutan would reverberate throughout India, threatening peace in the region and escalating the crisis along the Sino-Indian border. The issue requires close attention from New Delhi as well as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—the Indo-Pacific partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.

   Although it has no diplomatic presence in Bhutan, China has gone to great lengths to ensure lines of communication remain open between the two countries. This year, discussions about the border have increased in frequency after a nearly two-year lull, reflecting greater urgency on Beijing’s part. The latest meeting took place in May in Thimphu, Bhutan, just months after Chinese and Bhutanese representatives gathered in Kunming, China. The group agreed to “push forward” a three-step road map signed in October 2021, with the overarching aim of facilitating another round of formal boundary talks, which were postponed following the 2017 standoff between China and India in Doklam and the COVID-19 pandemic.

   That Chinese diplomats have returned to the negotiating table with their Bhutanese counterparts has likely fueled unease in India and among the other Quad countries. After his state visit to Brussels in March, an interview with Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering by the Belgian newspaper La Libre highlighted his country’s readiness to resolve the ongoing issue on its border with China. Unsurprisingly, Chinese state media latched on to the article to put further pressure on India; the Global Times singled out New Delhi as the “main obstacle” standing in the way of settling the dispute.

   However, resolving the issue of China and Bhutan’s border is not a simple task. China now lays claim to locations in three separate geographic locations, including Doklam in the west, the sacred Buddhist area of the Beyul Khenpajong in the north, and the Sakteng wildlife sanctuary in the east. (The wildlife sanctuary, which doesn’t sit on the border, only appeared in Chinese demands in 2020.) These claims reflect Beijing’s bad-faith negotiating, which has marred talks between the two countries since they began in 1984. It’s clear why neither side has made progress through negotiations, despite meeting frequently over the years.

   Since 1996, China has offered an exchange of territory with Bhutan, seeking to relinquish its claim to disputed regions in the north in exchange for Bhutan ceding more strategically important territory in the west. For Beijing, Doklam remains the goal: It sits at a junction that connects Tibet, Bhutan, and India, and it would provide the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with a tactical advantage. To make this a more attractive proposition, China noted that the territory in the north was far larger than the territory it sought. Although the initial offer nearly worked, the 1996 talks ultimately broke down.

   Bhutan’s unwavering refusal to accept the deal may have prompted China to add the Sakteng claim, sending a message about how far it will go. Meanwhile, China has stepped up its coercive measures and opted for more creative means of reaching a breakthrough. This began with border incursions, which escalated significantly in the 2000s before transitioning to the rapid construction of cross-border civilian and military infrastructure. As Robert Barnett reported in Foreign Policy in 2021, China erected entire villages inside Bhutan’s borders in recent years; Gyalaphug village in the northern Beyul region is one of three the Chinese have constructed, along with miles of roads, CCP administrative centers, and outposts for military, police, and other security officers.

   Such an elaborate construction drive may seem to contradict China’s apparent preference for the western regions, including its offer to exchange the very land on which it has built villages. But this view misunderstands the CCP’s motive: Rather than annexing Bhutanese territory to occupy it fully, the CCP’s main objective seems to be to strike at the core of Bhutan’s Buddhist culture. As Barnett wrote, Bhutan ceding the Beyul region—an area of immense cultural and religious importance—is as likely as Britain giving up Stonehenge. The silent occupation is instead intended to force the hand of the Bhutanese leadership, making it more eager to discuss the future of Doklam.

   The status of Doklam is ultimately a trilateral concern. Bhutan and India have shared a special relationship since signing a treaty of friendship in 1949, which afforded India guidance over Bhutan’s foreign and defense policy; they have maintained this connection even after the treaty was relaxed in 2007. In 2017, Chinese troops clashed with Indian soldiers in the region over a Chinese attempt to build a road connecting Doklam with Tibet. The disputed region represents a vulnerability for both India and China. To the south, Doklam borders the Siliguri corridor, a sliver of land that connects the heart of India to its northeastern regions. It is the only land route for Indian troops to reach territory including the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which was a major theater of conflict in the 1962 Sino-Indian war and where the two armies have clashed as recently as last year.

   Similarly, the Chumbi Valley to the north of Doklam—often described as a Chinese dagger into Indian territory—represents a weakness for China, which sees the ancient gateway to Tibet as vulnerable to a pincer movement, in which Indian troops could strike from both sides of the valley at once—from Bhutan and India. By extending its claim by 89 square kilometers south of the intersection with Bhutan and India, China hopes to gain a vantage point that could serve both offensive and defensive purposes in a potential conflict with India.

  China’s increased urgency toward border talks with Bhutan should not be seen in isolation. Resolving the dispute over Doklam is inextricably linked to the conflict on China and India’s shared border, and specifically to the status of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as an extension of South Tibet. With Doklam under its control, China could exert more pressure on India; Chinese forces could easily sever India’s connection to the eastern part of their disputed border. Such a resolution would also almost certainly precede more ambitious moves from China in Arunachal Pradesh, which could draw in the United States. (U.S. intelligence has already assisted the Indian military in previous border skirmishes.)

   The outcome of negotiations between China and Bhutan will loom heavily over the future of peace along the China-India border, as well as broader geopolitical tensions. Although the discussions are speeding up, China and Bhutan have not yet set a date for the all-important 25th round of boundary talks, where a significant breakthrough would be most likely. Looking west, the United States and India are actively deepening their ties; it appears inevitable that the Quad will have to bring military cooperation within its framework. With such high stakes, New Delhi should urge Thimphu to maintain the status quo in Doklam in the face of continued pressure from Beijing.

 

Marcus Andreopoulos is a senior research fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation, an international policy assessment group, as well as a subject matter expert for the Global Threats Advisory Group at NATO DEEP.

(Foreign Policy Magazine)