OCTOBER 2, 1999 HUNGER STRIKE ON ‘NO SEAT, NO VOTE’ ISSUE

Just days before the scheduled date of the proposed hunger strike on October 2, 1999, the OSU and SIBLAC formed the Sikkimese Nepalese Apex Committee (SNAC) in Geyzing, West Sikkim. The new body was formed at a joint meeting of the OSU and SIBLAC and was chaired by K.C. Pradhan. Buddhilal Khamdak, a young and educated Nepali from the Limbu community in West Sikkim, was made the SNAC’s Convenor. The newly-formed body supported the seat issue demand raised by the SIBLAC and OSU and urged the two organisations to support the demand on restoration of Assembly seats of the Sikkimese Nepalese.

   On October 2, while the rest of the nation celebrated the 130th birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi (Gandhi Jayanti), the Sikkimese people – represented by SIBLAC, OSU and SNAC – sought the blessing of the ‘Father of the Nation’ and the Guardian Deities of Sikkim in their struggle on restoration of their political rights. The 12-hour hunger strike by six representatives of the three ethnic communities at the ‘BL House’ in Gangtok on October 2 symbolically ushered in a new phase in the fight for restoration of the political rights of bonafide Sikkimese belonging to the three ethnic communities.  Four members of the SIBLAC – two convenors (Nima Lepcha and Pintso Bhutia), Vice-Convenor Tenzing Namgyal, and a woman representative (Gyamsay Bhutia), the SNAC Advisor K.C. Pradhan and myself as OSU Chairman took part in the historic one-day hunger strike on October 2, 1999.

The 12-hour hunger strike by Sikkimese representatives at the ‘BL House’, Gangtok, on October 2, 1999.

(Left to Right) Tenzing Namgyal, Jigme N Kazi, Nima Lepcha, Pintso Bhutia, KC Pradhan and Gyamsay   Bhutia.   

   We had actually chosen the premises where the ‘Statues of Unity’ are installed for the venue of the one-day hunger strike. Located in the heart of the capital at the northern end of the Mahatma Gandhi Marg – the main market area in the capital – this venue would have been the ideal place to begin a prolonged and intensive campaign on the seat issue. However, the State Government refused to allow us to use this place. In fact, it asked us to call off the hunger strike and the boycott call.

   In a letter to the SIBLAC, dated September 17, 1999, Chief Secretary Sonam Wangdi said redressal of grievances should be done through participation in the electoral process and pointed out that boycott of elections “is the last action to be taken as the final resort when all other means have failed.” The Chief Secretary simply could not see that we had resorted to this method as “all other means”, including the electoral process, in the past two decades failed to achieve the desired result. We ignored the government’s plea and went ahead with the hunger strike.

   However, it must be placed on record that if it hadn’t been for the OSU the hunger strike and boycott call may have been put off. Pradhan and I tactfully and very firmly exerted enough pressure on the SIBLAC leadership, which was dithering on the issue at the last moment when they were under extreme pressure. Even if the SIBLAC had backed off at the last moment the OSU and SNAC would have certainly continued with the mission. No amount of tactics and pressure would work on Pradhan and me and on this we were very confident.

   As planned, we held the hunger strike on October 2 to remind the world that we were determined to struggle on till our demand on restoration of our political rights were met. While others fought the elections we fought for our people. We were not concerned with who wins or loses in the polls; our main concern was that if the Assembly seats were not restored to us in the near future we would be the ultimate losers and the electoral process would then become a meaningless ritual as the Sikkimese people would have no future to look forward to.

 

(Ref: The Lone Warrior: Exiled In My Homeland, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 2014.)

TIBET AND SIKKIM DID NOT ACCEPT 1890 CONVENTION

Sir Charles Bell, Britain’s Political Officer in Gangtok with additional responsibility for Tibet and Bhutan, called the Chumbi Valley, where the Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in a tantalising minuet, “a dagger aimed at the heart of India.” Vincent Coelho, independent India’s much later official in the same position, claimed “that India’s frontier with China is the Chumbi Valley and the crest of the Himalayas along Sikkim’s northern border with Tibet.”

Chumbi Valley

Strictly speaking, India is not involved in today’s dispute over the Doklam plateau where the Chinese are said to claim 269 sq km of Bhutanese territory. But Jawaharlal Nehru’s warning in the Lok Sabha in 1959 “We have publicly, and rightly, undertaken certain responsibilities for the defence of Sikkim and Bhutan, if they are attacked. It is very necessary for us to understand that if anything happens on their borders, then it is the same thing as an interference with the border of India” still shapes policy. Doklam is one of the four disputed areas in Haa and Paro in western Bhutan. Haa Dzong (Castle) is the family seat of the once powerful Dorjee clan of the half-Sikkimese Ashi Kesang Wangchuck, whose grandson, King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck, is the current “Dragon King.” Haa is also the headquarters of the Indian Military Training Team in Bhutan and, therefore, an object of Chinese suspicion. India’s southernmost military post is at Dokolam on the China-Bhutan-India tri-junction.

The kings (Chogyals) of Sikkim had their traditional seat in the Chumbi Valley. It was the subject of prolonged Anglo-Chinese negotiations in the late 19th Century when Sheng Tai, the Manchu envoy, not only had to contend with Lord Lansdowne, the viceroy, who himself argued Britain’s case, but was also under the influence of his British secretary. The crumbling and corrupt Celestial Empire was in no position to resist such high-powered pressure, and the negotiations ended in the Anglo-Chinese convention of 1890 which affirmed Britain’s protectorate over the Kingdom of Sikkim, and gave the Chumbi Valley to China.

    The Chogyal of Sikkim and Bhutan's Ashi Phuntsho Choden, Thimphu, Bhutan.

Neither of the two principals, Sikkim and Tibet, was consulted. The protesting Tibetans announced they did not recognise the Convention, as did Sikkim which clung to her title to the Chumbi Valley. Legally, the Convention was of doubtful worth. In practical terms, it was irrelevant, for the exercise of British power mattered far more than fudged legality. With or without the benefit of Chinese acknowledgement of British pretensions, the Viceroy did as he pleased in the Himalayas.

It was an age when all Asia deferred to the white man. Stirring events, including the only major engagement the British ever fought in Sikkim, preceded the Convention. The Tibetan army was finally pushed back through Jelap-la in September 1888, and the Derbyshire regiment poured into Chumbi to ransack the “large three-storied rambling building… rich with valuable and curious China, costly arms and all sorts of quaint curiosities” that was the Chogyal’s palace.

It suited British strategy to act on the assumption that Tibet was subject to China. That way, the Tibetans could not threaten British actions in the Himalayas while an enfeebled China was no threat at all. The British again ignored Tibet’s rights in the trade regulation talks three years later, and insulted and imprisoned the Dalai Lama’s envoy, refusing to allow him any part in the negotiations. Claude White, then Political Officer, deliberately did not wait for Tibet’s representatives in 1895 when he erected boundary pillars at Jelap-la in the presence of three Chinese commissioners. These pillars along a 14,500-ft ridge gave, and give, India’s artillery an overview of the entire Chumbi Valley, including military fortifications and troop movements.

This is probably what the People’s Liberation Army is trying to correct. A road through the Doklam plateau along the eastern Bhutanese edge of the Chumbi Valley would counter the advantage the British gave themselves at Jelap-la on the Valley’s western Sikkimese border. China reportedly offered Bhutan a package deal in 1996 to exchange its claim to 495 sq km of land in the north-central sector of Bumthang in return for the 269 sq km in Doklam.

It seemed a wonder China did not ask for abrogation of the 1890 Convention as yet another “unequal treaty” forced on the dying Qing dynasty just as it repudiated or demanded renegotiation of many other treaties. One reason could be that it enshrined British recognition of the Chumbi Valley as Chinese. A no less vital reason with contemporary political relevance may be that it portrayed China as Tibet’s suzerain power. The historian John Rowland claimed, “Peking, which sees the Himalayan states as irredentist regions to be regained as soon as possible, also assigns to them an offensive role. They can be future bases for the subversion of India.” But this is to overlook modern China’s sophisticated diplomacy. Beijing already controls Tibet. It knows Sikkim is beyond its reach. Nepal is probably thought to be more trouble than it’s worth. Bhutan alone remains to be wooed.

Zhou En-lai sounded jubilant at his New Delhi press conference on 30 April 1960 when he was asked about Chinese claims to Bhutan. “I am sorry to disappoint” he retorted. “We have no claim with regard to Bhutan, nor do we have any dispute with it. You may recall that in its letters to the Indian Government, the Chinese Government twice mentioned that China has no boundary dispute with Sikkim and Bhutan, and that China respects India’s special relations with Sikkim and Bhutan.” This is India’s version. According to China’s Hsinhua News Agency, Zhou said, “proper relations” (as in his note to New Delhi) and not “special” relations. The distinction is interesting for “special” is not always “proper.” Although Zhou dismissed the McMahon Line as “illegally delineated through an exchange of secret notes by British imperialism with the Tibetan local authorities of China,” he did not, for the reasons already suggested, denounce the 1890 Convention as another fraudulent imposition.

But, presumably, China seeks to improve on its gains from the Convention. Hence, the PLA’s attempt to build a motorable road “inside Bhutanese territory” from Dokala in the Doklam area towards the Royal Bhutanese Army camp at Zornpelri. Having reportedly already built what the Bhutanese media calls “a major road till the Yadong town in the Chumbi Valley,” the Chinese are apparently trying to take it as close as they can to the Indian and Bhutanese borders. India is paranoiac about security in the region. One of the reasons why the late King Birendra of Nepal lost New Delhi’s favour was his proposal for a six-point zone of peace that would, in India’s view, bring the Chinese right down to the Nepal-India border. Neither Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck nor his ministers will make a similar mistake.

(Sunanda K. Datta-Ray, Free Press Journal, July 8, 2017, Sons of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Notion Press, 2020.)

 

STEPPING OUT TO SET THINGS RIGHT

For the true Sikkimese, May 16, 1975 heralded the end of an era and perhaps the beginning of a new struggle to preserve ‘Sikkim for Sikkimese’; but, this time, within the bounds of India, a great nation ruled by petty politicians and corrupt bureaucrats. This was an ideal that inspired me and shaped the course of my life ever since I returned to my native land at the end of 1982 after nearly twenty years.

   To aim high, think big and struggle for a worthy cause – for unity, identity and a common destiny for all people in Sikkim – was the agenda that I had set for myself both in my profession and later on in politics. Anything less than that was totally unacceptable to me and not worth the risk, toil and the endless struggle that lasted for more than two decades.

   By the end of 1999 – the last year of the 20th century – I felt a certain sense of restlessness and impatience that I hadn’t experienced before. I needed and wanted to step out of the narrow confines of my profession and free myself to openly and directly place my views to the outside world on certain issues of public interest which were close to my heart and which guided my professional and political outlook for a long, long time.

   Journalism does not allow you to mingle personal feelings and political inclinations with professional duties. The respect that I had for my profession had one disadvantage – it became a wall between me and my people. While freeing me in some ways it also enslaved me. I could not remain in the cage any longer – I needed and wanted to come out and set myself free. I could not and would not allow my precious dream to die in the hands of petty politicians without getting personally and politically involved in the struggle towards achieving my goals.

  Even if I face defeat my effort and struggle to pursue my dream would be worthwhile. I will not feel guilty of playing it safe and shying away in my neat little corner when the ideal thing to do was to come out in the open and take your stand - come what may!  Those who knew me well, respected me, and had great faith and trust in my capacity and commitment had no doubt about the honesty of my heart and the righteousness of my cause that drove me to place my case to the outside world.

   It was US President Theodore Roosevelt who once said: “The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena - whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood...who knows the great enthusiams, the great devotions - and spends himself in a worthy cause - who at best if he wins knows the thrill of high achievement - and if he fails at least fails while daring greatly - so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who know neither victory or defeat.”

   In the autumn of 1999 I found myself in direct confrontation with the political establishment on issues that were close to my heart for a long time. You either take a stand and live out your dream or just talk about it, write about it but actually do nothing about it and spend the rest of your days regretting for not having spoken up and making your stand clear to the whole wide world. The fact is you are what you do and not what you want to do. The road to hell is certainly paved with good intentions. Our leaders who preach and do not practise should know where we are heading.

   In mid-September 1999, I, as the Chairman of the Organisation of Sikkimese Unity (OSU), supported a call for boycotting the ensuing Assembly elections in the State, scheduled for October 3, 1999. Though I had written about it earlier we actually did not make any plan to take such a radical step on the Assembly seat reservation issue. It just happened – quite spontaneously and to my great delight! The boycott call given by the Sikkim Bhutia-Lepcha Apex Committee (SIBLAC) – the apex body of the indigenous Bhutia-Lepchas in the State – was in reaction to the betrayal of people’s trust by the combined political leadership of the State and the Centre on the Assembly seat issue.

   The 1999 Assembly polls was the fifth Assembly elections in Sikkim since the arbitrary, undemocratic, unjust and abrupt abolition of Assembly seats reserved for the three ethnic communities in 1979. Not only were the political parties in the State fooling the people on the seat issue the Centre also refused to respond favourably and timely on the demand for restoration of the political rights of the Sikkimese people as per assurances given to them during the merger, which are reflected in the historic Tripartite Agreement of May 8, 1973 and Article 371F of the Constitution.

(Ref: The Lone Warrior: Exiled In My Homeland, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 2014.)

 

PALACE-PRADHAN BID TO SAVE SIKKIM

 Talks between the Palace and the leadership of the Sikkim Congress headed by Pradhan led to a dramatic development within the ruling party. It culminated in the passing of a controversial resolution aimed at safeguarding Sikkim’s separate identity – symbolised by the Chogyal and the national flag – and reducing the powers of the Chief Executive.

KC Pradhan

   In a letter dated March 12, 1975 to Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, twenty-nine of the thirty-two legislators (excluding Kazi, Khatiwada and Kalzang Gyatso of the Sikkim National Party), demanded that the Chief Executive be stripped from his powers and be made an adviser to the Sikkim Government in the “interests of smooth running of the administration and consonant with the dignity and prestige of the Sikkimese people,” transfer of three portfolios, vis. Home, Finance and Establishment from the Chief Executive to the Chief Minister; and removal of non-extension services of Indian officers who were in Sikkim on deputation.

(Left to Right) Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, B.S. Das and K.C. Pradhan.

   The resolution, while welcoming the Chogyal’s initiative on holding a “dialogue with the Chief Minister,” demanded the removal of three Indian offficers-on-duty (OSDs) – Jayanta Sanyal, K.M. Lal, and Davy Manavalam – who played a vital role in favour of Kazi during this period.

    Unfortunately, Lal got hold of the document containing the 6 resolutions when only 18 Assembly members had signed. In the House of 32, only 17 members were needed to rectify past mistakes. Datta-Ray writes, “He (Lal) realised how explosive it could be. The men who were constantly being lauded in India as Sikkim’s first freely elected representatives, and as the Chogyal’s implacable enemies, the very leaders New Delhi was using as a human battering-ram against the palace, had given notice of their intention of going their own way. They did not want the chief executive or his lieutenants. They wanted full governing powers.” He adds, “They were even prepared to come to terms with the Chogyal. If their demands reached the press or Parliament, Mrs. Gandhi’s government K.C. Pradhan

would stand vindicated by the very process it had fostered, and rejected by the men it was sponsoring. The conspiracy would have to be nipped in the bud if New Delhi were to save the achievements of the previous two years. More, the possibility of recurrence would firmly have to be ruled out. That could only be done by removing the totems of Sikkim’s separate identity – flag, distinctive number plates, freedom from Indian taxes, PO, chief executive and the Chogyal; everything, in fact, that remained of a kingdom protected by treaty even if it was called an associate state.”

  Pradhan later (in 1990s) maintained that it was his Cabinet colleague, Rinzing Tongden Lepcha, who conspired with the Chief Executive and mischievously betrayed the Sikkimese people. According to him, Lepcha visited Pradhan’s residence at Development Area in Gangtok, swore that he would keep the resolution document a top secret, and took all the four copies of the six-point resolution, including the original. He then promptly handed over the documents to Lal, who knowing that the plot was chalked out at Kazi’s residence in Gangtok, promised him the Chief Minister’s post.

 

(Ref: Sons of Sikkim: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Notion Press, 2020.)

 

KAZI WARNED OF ‘NEW THINKING’ IN SIKKIM IF MERGER TERMS VIOLATED

The former Chief Minister, Kazi Lhendup Dorji Khangsarpa, said if the Centre does not honour the terms of the merger and fails to protect the distinct regional identity of Sikkim, new developments may take place in the strategically located mountain State of Sikkim, which merged with the Indian Union one and half decade back.

   Stating that the former Himalayan kingdom’s merger with India was conditional, the ageing Kazi, who is now 88, said in a Press statement that Sikkim had merged with the Indian Union in 1975 under the terms and conditions of the May 8 Agreement, 1973. Referring to the pre-merger period, the Kazi said Sikkim joined the Indian Union on the basis of the Agreement signed between the Chogyal of Sikkim, the Government of India and the leaders of political parties in Sikkim.

   The merger took place in 1975 when the Sikkimese people were convinced that the “rights and interests of the various sections of the people” in Sikkim would be fully protected by the Government of India, the Press release issued by the Kazi said. But if the spirit of the merger is not respected and if the “rights and interests” of the three ethnic communities (Lepchas, Bhutias and Nepalese) are not protected, as laid down in the Agreement, “new developments” may take place in Sikkim which the Centre cannot afford.

   The Kazi has appealed to the Centre as well as the State Government to give “top priority” to maintain communal harmony and preserve the “distinct regional identity of Sikkim” within the Union. This, he said, can only be done by providing “adequate safeguards” to the three ethnic groups in Sikkim.

   “I was the one who brought democracy to Sikkim and I want the people to enjoy the fruits of democracy”, the Kazi told reporters at his Kalimpong residence earlier this week. However, the “democratic aspirations” of the people have not been met and the “growth of democracy and democratic institutions” in Sikkim “suffered a setback”, the Press statement said. The Kazi is now fully convinced that the Centre is neglecting the State after absorbing it into the mainstream. Stating that the country cannot afford to have “hostile border states at this juncture”, Kazi said “every effort should be made to keep the unity of the Sikkimese people and to safeguard the sovereignty of the nation.” It may be mentioned that prior to the merger political rights of the Sikkimese were fully protected through reservation of seats in the Assembly for all the three ethnic communities.

   Unfortunately, four years after the, merger the Indian Parliament abolished the seats reserved for the Sikkimese Nepalese while reducing seats reserved for the minority Bhutia-Lepchas, who were declared ‘scheduled tribes’ in 1978. Today, the Centre is yet to fulfil the demand on restoration of Assembly seats of the Nepalese. The Chief Minister, Mr. N.B. Bhandari, has been pursuing the demand for restoration of seats for the Sikkimese Nepalese for over a decade. The move to reduce seats reserved for the tribals and to do away with one seat reserved for the Sangha, coupled with the Centre’s refusal to restore the lost seats of the Nepalese, is seen as an act of betrayal by the Centre and an attempt to gradually cause divisions amongst the people and to destroy the unique and distinct cultural identity of Sikkim.

   It is significant that the Kazi has come out with a strong statement defending the rights of the Sikkimese at a time when various parties are reportedly playing devious roles regarding restoration of Assembly seats for the Sikkimese, including Sikkimese Nepalese. While some people want reduction of seats reserved for the minority Bhutia-Lepcha tribals others are opposing demand for restoration of Assembly seats of the Sikkimese Nepalese. The seat issue, which is a major issue for Sikkim, is now pending before the constitution bench in the Supreme Court.

   Rampant corruption and communal politics are threatening to tear the unity of the Sikkimese people, the Kazi pointed out and added that Sikkim’s future was “dark”. “Despite knowing what is happening in Sikkim the Centre continues to ignore the plight of the Sikkimese people. I, as an architect of the merger and as the first Chief Minister of Sikkim, am fully convinced that what is happening in Sikkim needs to be looked into it carefully by the Government of India,” the release said.

   “If the Centre continues to ignore the real issues and problems faced by the people and if political parties and vested interests work against the long-term interest and unity of the Sikkimese people there is every likelihood of new thinking amongst the people regarding their future”, the Kazi warned.

(Ref: Sikkim Observer, January 26, 1991.)

NB: Sikkim Observer, a weekly English published from Gangtok from August 1986 by Jigme N. Kazi, has ceased publication since 2014 due to unfavourable situations in Sikkim).

 

 

LACHEN: MEMORIES & REFLECTIONS

 Lamten village in Lachen valley, north Sikkim, looked liked this in the 1950s and early 1960s.  

   I wasn’t prepared mentally or professionally to come back to settle in Sikkim in 1972. But at the end of 1982, I was. Though I had no idea of what I would be doing in Sikkim, I was convinced that I’d be doing what I wanted to do and not what someone else, including my parents, wanted me to do. By and large, most parents in Sikkim want their children to join government service. “Government service” is carved on the foreheads of every school-going children and their parents in Sikkim. My parents were no different, and though they could not tell me directly, I felt that they, particularly my father, wanted me to be in the government.        

   They naturally wanted a smooth and secure life. This is understandable in a place like Sikkim where people depend on the government for almost everything. To many, being placed in positions of authority, spelt success and status. But I had my own mind and held strong views on many things. What was important to me was not social status but social service, not what position one holds in society but what kind of person one really is. I had my way.

   However, I did apply for a government job at first. But this was basically a stop-gap arrangement. I knew I would be coming back to Sikkim for good at the end of 1982 and it was important that I get some sort of employment as soon as I reached Gangtok. In mid-1982, I applied for a job in the Labour Department where there was a post vacant at the under-secretary level. I felt that if I got the job it would at least help me financially at the initial stage. This would enable me to hang around for a while and get the feel of the place before I quit government service and start something on my own.

  But what I really wanted to do when I came back home was to go straight to my village in Lachen in north Sikkim and live there for at least two years. I had a strange and enlightening experience in Lachen in the winter of 1975-76. For the first time in my life, I started viewing the life-style of the village folks in Lachen in a different way. I felt a deep and warm appreciation of everything I saw – the people, their dress, mannerism, customs, language, places and everything which was a part of my village. I knew that it was only a matter of time when ‘civilisation’ would break in and put an end to its rich and unique life-style, which has been carefully preserved down the centuries.

    Unlike other places in Sikkim, the people of Lachen and Lachung, who live in the extreme north, are of pure Bhutia stock and have a rare and unique cultural identity of their own. Besides observing every aspect of life in Lachen and recording it, I myself had a strong desire to live and experience the life there once again. I felt unsatisfied at having spent only a few years of my childhood in Lachen and I still wanted to spend more time there.

The Sikkim Dewan, Nari Rustomji (second from right), with Lachen Pipons – Cho Ledon and Cho Kunga Rinchen (right) – and senior lamas of Lachen monastery and senior teacher Lopon Dochung (left), in Lachen, 1956-57.     

    This feeling has lasted all along, and when I went back to teach in MH in 1976 I kept a live interest on Sikkim’s history and its cultural heritage, which was gradually vanishing. I still have not been able to spend much time in Lachen as I had hoped. Perhaps there is a time for everything under the sun and I anxiously wait for the day when I can go back to the land where I was born and where I spent my childhood days. But the sad thing is that many of the older folks, whose company I would have enjoyed and who could also have given me invaluable information about Lachen, have passed away in the past several years, including my two grandfathers – Cho Dorji Lobon, the head lama of Lachen monastery, and Cho Chozila, an important and well-respected elder of the village, for whom I had great love, affection and admiration.

Cho Chozila

   Beside extracting authentic information from them, I have always wanted to be close to them and live with them for some time. Both of them passed away in mid-1992. This was a personal tragedy for me and my family and an irreparable loss to our village.            

    Unfortunately, two more influential elders of Lachen, Cho Wangchuk and Cho Pawo, passed away this year. Their passing away symbolised the end of an era that had been a part of the old Lachen and my childhood memories which I deeply miss and cherish.

   One of the few things in life which I regret most is my failure to spend some time in Lachen with my people. My newspaper work and my commitment as a journalist kept me away from my people. Bringing out the Observer has really been a one-man-show all the way and if it hadn’t been for that I could have made frequent trips to Lachen and spend a few weeks there at a stretch from time to time. But perhaps everything has its own time and I didn’t want to rush and he out of tune with life. I would have loved to lived the life of an ordinary villager in Lachen for a few years for the sheer joy and fun of it. It is only when we live our lives fully and completely that we are able to give as much as we want to receive.

(Ref: Inside Sikkim: Against The Tide, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 1993)

 

 

B.B. GURUNG: TORN BETWEEN LOYALTY TO SIKKIM AND LURE OF POWER

    LD Kazi and BB Gurung

   Ten years after his controversial move to declare ‘Prince’ Wangchuk the 13th Chogyal of Sikkim, Bhim Bahadur Gurung admitted that he had always felt uncomfortable and somewhat guilty at having been a party to the ‘selling of Sikkim’. Gurung saw the Chogyal’s death and his funeral on February 19, 1982, as a god-sent opportunity to expiate himself of the sins he had committed, and made attempts to ventilate his true feelings. In 1975, Gurung moved a resolution in the Assembly, abolishing “the institution of the Chogyal” and declaring Sikkim to be a “constituent unit of India”, thereby paving way for Sikkim to become the 22nd State of the Indian Union.

   “The guilt of having participated in the process of the merger has left a very deep and painful scar in my heart”, Gurung confided to me at his residence in Gangtok one afternoon in mid-1992. “By publicly acknowledging Prince Wangchuk to be the 13th Chogyal of Sikkim, I wanted to exonerate myself and get rid of this guilt,” Gurung explained. He revealed that he, then legislative leader of the Opposition, and his MLAs had made a controversial move in openly accepting Wangchuk as the 13th Chogyal of Sikkim on February 19, 1982, and thereby acknowledging the traditional process by which the Chogyals succeeded to the throne. If in 1975 Gurung was a party to the abolition of the Chogyal’s institution, in 1982 he more than made up for his past misdeeds by publicly acclaiming Wangchuk to be the 13th consecrated Chogyal of Sikkim and acknowledging the continuance of the Chogyals’ hereditary succession.

   Wangchuk’s response to his ‘crowning’ more than satisfied Gurung, who was ready to pay any price for his action, which was of great historical significance. In an interview to India Today after he was proclaimed the 13th Chogyal of Sikkim, Wangchuk stated: “It is not for me to proclaim myself the new Chogyal. It is for the people to accept and acknowledge me as the new Chogyal and you can see for yourself the support I have been shown by the people…We do have the custom of automatic succession that on the death of the Chogyal, the heir apparent becomes the new Chogyal.”

    “I was all prepared to face any consequence and was even ready to get arrested and face jail sentence,” Gurung pointed out to me, and added, “Even my family members were conscious of what I was doing and were prepared to face any eventuality.” Referring to the Chogyal’s “enthronement”, Gurung said the people expected Bhandari, who was then the Chief Minister, to back him. “But his handling of the situation showed that Bhandari’s patriotism was superficial,” Gurung explained.

   Gurung boasts that unlike some MLAs, he stuck to his stand and refused to compromise and withdraw his signature from the historic document submitted to Wangchuk on February 19. Sunanda K. Datta-Ray in his book – Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim, describes Gurung as a “leading architect” and “prominent” among those who bartered away the Kingdom’s independence. Referring to Gurung’s opportunistic tendencies, the book adds: “In the distant past, Gurung had enthusiastically defended his King’s demand for independence; but he had recanted his loyalty to become one of New Delhi’s most loyal  adherents in Sikkimese politics.”

   Gurung’s nationalistic feelings surfaced when he was one of the three Executive Councillors of the Chogyal’s Sikkim Council way back in 1967, when the demand for revision of the Indo-Sikkim Treaty of 1950 by the Sikkimese, was worrying New Delhi. A joint statement on the Treaty revision issued by the three Executive Councillors – Netuk Tsering (Sikkim National Party), Nahakul Pradhan (Sikkim State Council), and B.B. Gurung (Sikkim National Congress) – on June 15, 1967, stated: “Since Sikkim signed the treaty with India, surely it is within her sovereign rights to demand a revision of the treaty as one of the signatories. In fact, Sikkim gained her Sovereign Status on the 15th August, 1947, when India achieved her independence from the British rule. Every country has its inherent right to exist and maintain its separate identity and, therefore, to review and revise its treaty obligations in the wake of changing circumstances.”

   Though Gurung’s political actions in the past may have been motivated by occasional nationalistic feelings, his confession about his attempt to atone himself of the political sins he had committed during the merger era, reflected the painful experience and the burden of guilt that all merger veterans have had to live with.

(Ref: Inside Sikkim: Against the Tide, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications, 1993)