MAY 8, 1973 AGREEMENT: INDIA’S ‘TROJAN HORSE’ FOR SIKKIM TAKEOVER

Secret pact

During his next “unannounced” visit to Sikkim on April 21¹ Kewal Singh brought the draft agreement to be signed by the Chogyal, the Government of India, and leaders of major political parties of Sikkim. One of Singh’s main assignments this time was to sign a “secret pact” with the Choygal. On April 23, a “confidential” document titled “Agreement between the Chogyal and the Government of India” was signed in Gangtok, which promised to preserve “the identity of Sikkim” and “the constitutional position of the Chogyal of Sikkim”. Anti-Chogyal forces viewed the move as a bid by New Delhi to “restore the durbar to power”. However, major issues raised in the agreement were also included in the draft of the proposed tripartite agreement.

Datta-Ray observed: “But the durbar was relieved because it rightly believed that Sikkim could not be absorbed while its throne survived. Kewal Singh also promised the Chogyal that the administrator would be another dewan, and would be withdrawn as soon as the political situation had stabilized. If all this was reassuring, the durbar was baffled and worried by the foreign secretary’s insistence on complete secrecy. It would have liked the tripartite agreement either to confirm the earlier one or to repeat that the monarchy and Sikkim’s status as a protectorate remained unimpaired. But Kewal Singh assured the Chogyal that the 8 May document was only for public consumption, a sop to Kazi and his colleagues, and that the 23 April agreement was the operative one. Moreover, he continued, any reference to the monarchy or to relations with India might have suggested to the 15 signatories that both matters were within their jurisdiction.²  

After making minor changes in the tripartite agreement in the Foreign Office in New Delhi, the Foreign Secretary returned to Gangtok on May 7 with the revised draft. With great reluctance the Chogyal signed the agreement the next day on May 8 at the Palace at 9 p.m.. This was only after he was assured by Kewal Singh that “the tripartite agreement was basically the same as of April 23 except for minor variations to the satisfaction of the political parties and should, as such, be treated as a “Public Relations Document”³

Before the signing of the agreement in the Palace, the Chogyal gave a dressing down to JAC leaders and accused them of “betrayal and sell-out to India”. Because of their “treachery” they were “not worthy of being called Sikkimese” and the people of Sikkim would never forgive them for their devious ways. Das recalls how the Chogyal felt during the signing of the agreement: “The famous May 8 Agreement was signed at 9 P.M. in the Palace. At first, Kazi and his group refused to go to the Palace. K.C. Pradhan and B.B. Gurung expressed a fear that the Chogyal would poison their liquor! Narbahadur Khatiwada protested on principle and wanted the Chogyal to come to the India House to sign the document. After great persuasion, they trooped into the Palace. Used to years of subservience, they bowed to the Chogyal in reverence and the latter let them have it. He was full of liquor already and surcharged with emotions; he accused the leaders of betrayal and sell-out to India. Sikkim and her people would never forgive them for their treachery. Instead of him, they would now have an Indian Chogyal to rule. They were not worthy of being called Sikkimese having sold their country. None uttered a word as if they were under a spell. The Chogyal’s performance was superb. He took out his pen and signed. The others followed including the National Party and Kewal Singh. The Foreign Secretary swallowed all the abuses showered on the political leaders that night but never forgave the Chogyal for this.”⁴

Tripartite Agreement 1973

(Left to Right) Kewal Singh (Indian Foreign Secretary), Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal, K.S. Bajpai (Indian Political Officer) and Karma Topden (Deputy Secretary to the Chogyal) during the signing of the Tripartite Agreement of May 8^th, 1973, in Gangtok.

There were mixed reactions to the May 8 Agreement. The Indian Press hailed it as a “significant breakthrough”. Kazi and his colleagues viewed it as a decisive victory for their party. But the Chogyal, sensing the agreement to be an “eyewash”, remained a “silent spectator”. He was acutely aware of New Delhi’s role in the present turmoil in Sikkim and was certain that the signing of the May 8 Agreement was a prelude to “bigger things”. “His first disillusionment came when the May 8 Agreement was placed before the Indian Parliament. He called me and asked the implications. When I told him that this was going to be the basis of the new political arrangement, he blew up. Based on the assurances of the Foreign Secretary, he considered it only a public relations document, treating April 23 Agreement as the valid one. When told that subsequent agreement on the same issue supersedes the previous one, specially when it was a tripartite agreement and placed before the Indian Parliament, he accused the Foreign Secretary of duplicity and breach of faith,” writes Das. He adds: “The Chogyal lost complete confidence in Kewal Singh and his doubts that Delhi was planning the merger of Sikkim never left him thereafter.”⁵

The May 8 Agreement, signed between the Chogyal, the Government of India represented by the Foreign Secretary, and five representatives of the three major political parties of Sikkim led by L.D. Kazi (SNC), K.C. Pradhan (SJC) and Netuk Tsering Lama (SNP),  was a major achievement for New Delhi and anti-Chogyal, anti-Sikkim forces in Sikkim. The April agitation and subsequent Indian takeover of Sikkim’s administration on April 8, culminating in the tripartite agreement is significant. The signing of the Agreement marked a decisive phase in the kingdom’s political development, and was, as suspected by the Chogyal and Sikkimese nationalists, one of the major steps to make Sikkim a part and parcel of India.

(Ref: SONS OF SIKKIM: The Rise and Fall of the Namgyal Dynasty of Sikkim, Jigme N. Kazi, Hill Media Publications & Notion Press, 2020.)